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 Abstract 
 The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is the crown jewel of the world’s most 
advanced international system for protecting civil and political liberties. In recent years, 
however, the ECtHR has become a victim of its own success. The Court now faces a docket 
crisis of massive proportions, the consequence of the growing number of states subject to 
its jurisdiction, its favourable public reputation, its expansive interpretations of individual 
liberties, a distrust of domestic judiciaries in some countries, and entrenched human rights 
problems in others. In response to this growing backlog of individual complaints, the Council 
of Europe has, over the last ﬁ ve years, considered numerous proposals to restructure the Euro-
pean human rights regime and redesign the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
This article argues that these proposals should be understood not as ministerial changes in 
supranational judicial procedure, nor as resolving a debate over whether the ECtHR should 
strive for individual or constitutional justice, but rather as raising more fundamental ques-
tions concerning the Court’s future identity. In particular, the article argues for recognition 
of  ‘ embeddedness ’ in national legal systems as a deep structural principle of the ECHR, a prin-
ciple that functions as a necessary counterpoint to the subsidiary doctrine that has animated 
the Convention since its founding. Embeddedness does not substitute ECtHR rulings for the 
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decisions of national parliaments or domestic courts. Rather, it requires the Council of Europe 
and the Court to bolster the mechanisms for governments to remedy human rights violations 
at home, obviating the need for individuals to seek supranational relief and restoring countries 
to a position in which the ECtHR’s deference to national decision-makers is appropriate. 
 1   Introduction 
 The achievements of the European Convention on Human Rights (the European Con-
vention; the Convention; ECHR) 1 and its supreme judicial tribunal, the European Court 
of Human Rights (the ECtHR or the Court), are widely acclaimed by scholars, lawyers, 
government ofﬁ cials, and human rights advocates. Since its founding over 50 years ago, 
the Convention has expanded along three axes  – jurisprudentially, institutionally, and 
geographically. What was once an agreement among a small group of Western Euro-
pean states to guarantee core civil and political liberties by means of an optional judicial 
review mechanism has now been supplemented by 14 protocols, one of which  – Protocol 
No. 11  – recast the ECtHR as a permanent, full-time court with compulsory jurisdiction 
over all member states to which aggrieved individuals enjoy direct access. 2 Following 
the accession to the Council of Europe of former Soviet bloc states, the ECtHR’s reach 
now extends to more than 800 million people in 47 countries stretching the length and 
breadth of the continent and beyond, from Azerbaijan to Iceland and from Gibraltar 
to Vladivostok. It is no exaggeration to state that the Convention and its growing and 
diverse body of case law have transformed Europe’s legal and political landscape, quali-
fying the ECtHR as the world’s most effective international human rights tribunal. 
 Recent news from the Council of Europe’s headquarters in Strasbourg, France, is 
not so good, however. Since 2000, the Council’s political bodies, legal experts, and 
the judges of the Court have been engaged in an intensive exercise in institutional 
reform. 3 To state the problem bluntly, the ECHR is becoming a victim of its own suc-
cess and now faces a docket crisis of massive proportions. A combination of factors  – 
the Court’s positive public reputation, its expansive interpretations of the Convention, 
a distrust of domestic judiciaries in some countries, and entrenched human rights 
problems in others  – has attracted tens of thousands of new individual applications 
annually. The crush of cases shows no sign of abating and threatens to bury ECtHR 
judges and Registry lawyers in paper. 4 Dozens of resolutions, recommendations, and 
 1  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 Nov. 1950, 213 UNTS 
222 (hereinafter European Convention). 
 2  Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Re-
structuring the Control Machinery Established Thereby, ETS No. 155. 
 3  For a useful review of these activities and a discussion of their signiﬁ cance see Caﬂ isch,  ‘ The Reform of 
the European Court of Human Rights: Protocol No. 14 and Beyond ’ , 6  Human Rts L Rev (2006) 403, 
at 403 – 415;  S. Greer , The European Convention on Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and Prospects 
(2006), at 136 – 165. 
 4  See Caﬂ isch,  supra note 3, at 404 ( ‘ With its 45 judges and about 250 Registry lawyers, the Court is 
presently confronted with an accumulated case-load of 82,600 applications, out of which 45,550 were 
made in 2005, the yearly capacity of absorption of the Court now being at around 28,000 cases ’ ). 
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experts ’ reports reiterate the same prophetic message: if drastic steps are not taken, 
the rosy picture of the ECtHR’s efﬁ cacy sketched in the previous paragraph may soon 
be only a historical portrait. 
 Discussions of how to ensure the survival of the ECtHR have been framed prin-
cipally in terms of modifying the Court’s institutional structures and its procedures 
to manage more efﬁ ciently the growing backlog of cases. For example, what addi-
tional resources and personnel does the Court require? How many judges should 
review complaints at different stages of the proceedings? Is there a need for a separate 
chamber dedicated to deciding admissibility issues? Can judges do more to encourage 
friendly settlements? Yet lurking beneath these often technocratic issues of judicial 
housekeeping are profound substantive questions about how the Court accomplishes 
its core mandate  – protecting civil and political liberties enshrined in the Conven-
tion  – and whether the mechanisms it uses to achieve that goal need to be revised in 
response to changes in the legal and political landscape of human rights protection 
in Europe. 
 To the extent that the substantive dimension of the ECtHR reform process has 
received a public airing, the debate has focused on whether the Court should pro-
vide  ‘ individual ’ or  ‘ constitutional ’ justice. Advocates of the former view argue 
that the right of individual petition is the centrepiece of the Strasbourg supervi-
sory system and, as a result, that the ECtHR should  ‘ hear any case, from anyone 
who claims to be a victim of the Convention ’ and provide a remedy to every indi-
vidual whose human rights have been violated. 5 Proponents of the latter position 
 – including the most recent past President of the Court and its Registrar 6  – argue 
that the ECtHR should concentrate on providing  ‘ fully reasoned and authoritative 
[decisions] in cases which raise substantial or new and complex issues of human 
rights law, are of particular signiﬁ cance for the State concerned or involve allega-
tions of serious human rights violations and which warrant a full process of con-
sidered adjudication ’ . 7 
 In this article, I argue that neither the technocratic, procedural view of the 
ECtHR reform process nor the debate between individual and constitutional justice 
 proponents adequately captures the nature and scope of the challenges facing the 
These statistics are current as of 1 May 2006:  ibid. , at 404 n. 3. The backlog of cases  ‘ is projected to 
rise to 250,000 by 2010 ’ . The Right Hon. The Lord Woolf  et al. ,  Review of the Working Methods of the 
European Court of Human Rights at 8 (Dec. 2005), available at:  www.echr.coe.int/eng/press/2005/Dec/ 
LORDWOOLFSREVIEWONWORKINGMETHODS2.pdf 
 5  Dembour,  ‘ “ Finishing Off ” Cases: the Radical Solution to the Problem of the Expanding ECTHR Caseload ’ 
[2002]  European Human Rts L Rev 604, at 621; see also Leach,  ‘ Access to the European Court of Human 
Rights  – From a Legal Entitlement to a Lottery? ’ , 27  Human Rts LJ (2006) 11. 
 6  See, e.g., Wildhaber,  ‘ A Constitutional Future for the European Court of Human Rights ’ , 23  Human Rts LJ 
(2002) 161, at 162 – 163; Mahoney,  ‘ New Challenges for the European Court of Human Rights Resulting 
from the Expanding Caseload and Membership ’ , 21  Pennsylvania State Int’l L Rev (2002) 101, at 105. 
 7  Committee of Experts for the Improvement of Procedures for the Protection of Human Rights,  Report of the 
Evaluation Group to Examine Possible Means of Guaranteeing the Effectiveness of the European Court of Human 
Rights , Doc. EG Court (2001), at para. 98 (27 Sept. 2001) (internal quotations omitted). 
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 Strasbourg supervisory system. In particular, the looming docket crisis has exposed 
and accelerated an incipient identity crisis for the Court, one whose origins date back 
nearly a decade to the structural changes ushered in by Protocol No. 11. This crisis 
has led the ECtHR to become increasingly embedded in the national legal systems of 
the Convention’s member states, often exercising functions that differ radically from 
those that the treaty’s drafters and the ﬁ rst generations of ECtHR judges had envis-
aged. More provocatively, I argue that  ‘ embeddedness ’ should serve as the touchstone 
for evaluating the diverse array of proposals to redesign and restructure the Court to 
ensure its future success. 
 Even casual observers of the ECtHR will immediately take issue with these claims. 
They appear, on ﬁ rst impression, to be directly contrary to the principle of subsidi-
arity that has served as a cornerstone of the European Convention since its found-
ing. In the context of European human rights adjudication, subsidiarity orients the 
relationship between supranational and national decision-makers. 8 It proceeds 
from the premise that the Strasbourg institutions are  ‘ supplementary and subsidi-
ary to the protection of rights and freedoms under national legal systems ’ , whose 
political, administrative, and judicial authorities retain the  ‘ primary responsibil-
ity ’ for guaranteeing the rights of individuals. 9 Although not expressly mentioned 
in the Convention, subsidiarity ﬁ nds its animating spirit in textual provisions such 
as the exhaustion of domestic remedies rule and the obligation to provide an effec-
tive national remedy. 10 It also informs ECtHR jurisprudence, including the margin of 
appreciation doctrine and the tribunal’s refusal to act as a fourth-instance appeal of 
national court rulings. 11 
 Both functional and normative rationales justify the subsidiarity principle. From 
a functional perspective, treating the Strasbourg supervisory system as ancillary to 
national mechanisms of human rights protection is a practical necessity.  ‘ In view of 
the limited resources at [the system’s] disposal, considerations of judicial expediency 
and efﬁ ciency ’ , require domestic judges and administrative bodies to act as the ﬁ rst-
line defenders of Convention rights and freedoms. 12 Normatively, subsidiarity helps 
to legitimize ECtHR review by providing a measure of deference to national actors 
in situations where such deference is  appropriate  – such as identifying the content 
 8  For a more comprehensive analysis of subsidiarity that extends beyond the European Convention see 
Carozza,  ‘ Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law ’ , 97  AJIL (2003) 38, 
at 39 (explaining the  ‘ original and most comprehensive sense ’ of subsidiarity and exploring its  ‘ deep af-
ﬁ nities  … with many of the implicit premises of international human rights norms, including presupposi-
tions about the dignity and freedom of human persons, the importance of their association with others, 
and the role of the state with respect to smaller social groups as well as individuals ’ ). 
 9  Y. Arai-Takahashi,  The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurispru-
dence of the ECHR (2002), at 236. 
 10  European Convention,  supra note 1, Art. 13 (obligating member states to provide an effective national 
remedy) and Art. 35 (exhaustion of domestic remedies). 
 11  See R. Blackburn and J. Polakiewicz,  Fundamental Rights in Europe: The ECHR and its Member States, 1950-
2000 (2001), at p. xiv. 
 12  Arai-Takahashi,  supra note 9, at 235. 
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of and values underlying national laws and practices or choosing among a range of 
 Convention-compatible implementation measures. 13 
 These twin justiﬁ cations for subsidiarity have shaped the evolution of the Strasbourg 
supervisory system. National governments established the Convention as an early 
warning system to sound the alarm in case Europe’s ﬂ edgling democracies began to 
backslide toward totalitarianism. 14 Over time, the Court assumed additional functions 
that are implicit in the Convention’s text and structure  –  ‘ protecting individuals and 
groups from the excesses of majoritarianism in healthy democracies ’ and resolving the 
relatively minor and discrete conﬂ icts of interests prevalent in any complex society. 15 A 
supranational judicial system designed to achieve these goals need only supplement, not 
supplant, national courts and other domestic mechanisms of human rights protection. 
 By the ﬁ rst decade of the 21st century, however, the ECtHR was exercising these 
functions with decreasing frequency. The Court now primarily concerns itself not 
with ﬂ agging and clearing roadblocks in domestic democratic processes or adju-
dicating good faith government restrictions on individual liberties, but rather with 
issues that are both far less and far more momentous. At one end of the spectrum, 
over half of the Court’s docket is populated with repetitive,  ‘ cookie cutter ’ complaints 
challenging insufﬁ ciently resourced and overburdened domestic judicial systems. 16 
Cases of this type have led the ECtHR to identify structural problems in civil, crimi-
nal, and administrative proceedings in countries that are otherwise stable and well-
 functioning democracies. 17 At the other end of the spectrum are claims of serious and 
pervasive human rights abuses such as extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture, 
and prolonged arbitrary detention. 18 Applicants in these cases have no meaningful 
 13  See, e.g., Greer,  supra note 3, at 216; Petzold,  ‘ The Convention and the Principle of Subsidiarity ’ , in R. St. 
J. Macdonald, F. Matscher, and H. Petzold (eds),  The European System for the Protection of Human Rights 
(1993), at 41, 60. 
 14  See Moravcsik,  ‘ The Origins of International Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar 
Europe ’ , 54  Int’l Org (2000) 217. 
 15  Greer,  supra note 3, at 40; see A.H. Robertson and J.H. Merrills,  Human Rights in the World (3rd edn., 
1989), at 62. 
 16  See Caﬂ isch,  supra note 3, at 405 (estimating that  ‘ more than half of the applications addressed to the 
Court concern Article 6 (fair trial), and at least half of these  – i.e. one quarter of the total number of 
applications  – concern the excessive length of proceedings ’ ); Greer,  supra note 3, at 74 – 76 (analysing 
ECtHR judgments ﬁ nding breaches of the Convention from 1999 to 2005 and concluding that over 75% 
concerned violations of fair trial rights or length of proceedings rules); see also Cichowski,  ‘ Courts, Rights 
and Democratic Participation ’ , 39  Comparative Political Stud (2006) 50, at 65 (noting the large number of 
fair trial cases before the ECtHR and explaining how the Court’s judgments  ‘ play a critical role in expand-
ing domestic access to legal institutions for private parties ’ ). 
 17  See App. No. 31210/96,  Kud ł a v. Poland (2000), at para. 148 (stating that the Court has  ‘ draw[n] atten-
tion to the important danger that exists for the rule of law within national legal orders when excessive 
delays in the administration of justice occur in respect of which litigants have no domestic remedy ’ ) (quo-
tations omitted); see also Wolf,  ‘ Trial Within a Reasonable Time: the Recent Reforms of the Italian Justice 
System in Response to the Conﬂ ict with Article 6(1) of the ECHR ’ , 9  Eur Public L (2003) 189. 
 18  See Mahoney,  ‘ Speculating on the Future of the Reformed European Court of Human Rights ’ , 20  Human 
Rts LJ (1999) 1, at 4 (predicting that, with accession of former Soviet bloc countries to the Convention, 
the ECtHR would be confronted with  ‘ serious human rights violations ’ such as  ‘ minorities in conﬂ ict with 
[a] central government ’ and cases relating to  ‘ terrorism, violence, and civil strife ’ ). 
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domestic remedies to exhaust, forcing the Court to function as both a ﬁ rst instance 
ﬁ nder of fact and a legal arbiter with respect to governments that sometimes resist its 
powers of review. 19 
 The arguments for subsidiarity and for deference to national decision-makers are 
far less persuasive in cases that occupy both ends of this spectrum. But these cases also 
highlight a more general and more fundamental point. If the ECHR now confronts 
human rights problems unlike those that motivated its founding after the Second 
World War, the actors that control the Court’s future  – the member states, the Coun-
cil of Europe’s political and expert bodies, and the ECHR judges themselves  – must 
devise new structural solutions to those problems. Strategically embedding the ECtHR 
in national legal systems provides such solutions where the justiﬁ cations for subsidi-
arity are lacking. 
 Embeddedness, as deﬁ ned in this article, does not ask the Court to take the place 
of national parliaments or national courts. To the contrary, it requires the redesign-
ing of the Council of Europe’s supervisory system  – including the work of its political 
and expert bodies as well as those of the ECHR  – to bolster the remedies that domestic 
judges and legislatures provide to individuals whose rights have been violated. 20 Such 
bolstering is essential to move (or to restore) countries to a position in which greater 
deference to national decision-makers is (or is once again) appropriate. Stated differ-
ently, embeddedness is a deep structural principle of the European Convention, one 
that provides an essential counterpoint to the deep structural principle of subsidiarity 
described above. 21 
 The remainder of this article makes the case for redesigning the Strasbourg super-
visory system to embed the ECtHR more ﬁ rmly in national legal systems. Part 2 
begins by situating the embeddedness principle in existing interdisciplinary scholar-
ship and analysing the values of embeddedness for the long-term effectiveness of the 
European human rights regime. It then explains the distinction between direct and 
diffuse embeddedness and distinguishes those concepts from the individual and consti-
tutional justice rationales for ECtHR review. Part 3 documents how, in numerous and 
 19  See Memorandum on Threats to Applicants to the European Court of Human Rights in Cases from Chech-
nya, in Parliamentary Assembly, Report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights,  Member 
States’ Duty to Co-operate with the European Court of Human Rights , Doc 11183, App. I (9 Feb. 2007), avail-
able at:  http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/workingdocs/doc07/edoc11183.htm 
  (documenting the Russian authorities ’  ‘ lack of willingness to effectively investigate ’ the murder, disap-
pearance, beating, and harassment of individuals who had ﬁ led applications with the ECtHR alleging 
extrajudicial killings and disappearances of civilians in Chechnya). 
 20  See generally Slaughter and Burke-White,  ‘ The Future of International Law is Domestic (or, The Euro-
pean Way of Law) ’ , 47  Harvard J Int’l L (2006) 327, at 328 ( ‘ [T]he primary terrain of international law 
must shift  … from independent regulation above the national state to direct engagement with domes-
tic institutions. The three principal forms of such engagement are strengthening domestic institutions, 
backstopping them, and compelling them to act ’ ). 
 21  See Bradley Kar,  ‘ The Deep Structure of Law and Morality ’ , 84  Texas L Rev (2006) 877, at 882 (explain-
ing that many scholars use the term  ‘ deep structure ’ to describe the foundational principles embedded in 
laws and legal institutions); Fletcher,  ‘ What Law is Like ’ , 50  Southern Methodist U L Rev (1997) 1599, at 
1604 and n. 22 (discussing the increasing prevalence of the term ‘deep structure’ to describe these same 
principles). 
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diverse ways, the Court’s judgments are already becoming more deeply embedded in 
national legal systems. In some instances, member states and the Council of Europe’s 
political bodies have endorsed these developments. In others, the ECtHR has modi-
ﬁ ed its jurisprudence to establish greater control over domestic political and judicial 
decision-makers. Part 4 uses the embeddedness principle to evaluate several recently 
adopted and proposed reforms of the ECtHR. It then considers additional ways further 
to embed the European human rights regime in national legal systems in appropriate 
cases, as well as impediments to these proposals. 
 2   The Concept of Embeddedness and the European Human 
Rights Regime 
 This part ﬁ rst brieﬂ y reviews earlier international law and international relations 
scholarship that examines the effects of embedding international institutions in 
national legal and political systems. It then analyses the values of embeddedness for 
protecting the rights enshrined in the European Convention and further reﬁ nes the 
concept by distinguishing between direct and diffuse varieties of embeddedness. Part 
2 concludes by situating embeddedness in recent debates over whether the ECtHR 
should strive to provide individual or constitutional justice. 
 A Previous Analyses of Embeddedness 
 Several strands of scholarship consider how embedding international institutions 
in national legal systems improves the prospects for compliance with international 
law in general and the judgments of international tribunals in particular. Scholars 
use different labels to describe various facets of embeddedness. But the central idea 
that unites their work is the claim that compliance with international law increases 
when international institutions  – including tribunals  – can penetrate the surface of 
the state to interact with government decision-makers and private actors and to inﬂ u-
ence domestic politics. 
 In an early and inﬂ uential contribution, Robert Keohane described the process of 
 ‘ institutional enmeshment ’ , which  ‘ occurs when domestic decision making with 
respect to an international commitment is affected by the institutional arrangements 
established in the course of making or maintaining the commitment ’ . 22 States that are 
not enmeshed institutionally  ‘ may be legally obligated by international law to comply 
with their commitments ’ . But because these obligations are  ‘ not constitutionalized ’ in 
the country’s domestic legal and political structures,  ‘ they can be met or not as the state 
decides ’ . 23 By contrast, Keohane argues, countries that are institutionally enmeshed 
have  ‘ an increase[d]  … probability of compliance ’ , all other things being equal. 24 
 22  Keohane,  ‘ Compliance with International Commitments: Politics within a Framework of Law ’ , 86  Am 
Soc’y Int’l L Proceedings (1992) 176, at 179. 
 23  Ibid . 
 24  Ibid ., at 180. 
132 EJIL 19 (2008), 125–159
 Harold Koh’s transnational legal process theory emphasizes a different dimension 
of embeddedness. He describes the  ‘ vertical internalization of international norms 
into domestic legal systems ’ 25 that occurs when  ‘ nation states, corporations, interna-
tional organizations, and nongovernmental organizations interact in a variety of fora 
to make, interpret, enforce, and ultimately internalize rules of international law ’ . 26 
For Koh, these interactions generate a complex process  ‘ whereby international legal 
norms seep into, are internalized, and become embedded in domestic legal and politi-
cal processes ’ through  ‘ executive action, legislation, and judicial decisions which take 
account of and incorporate international norms ’ . 27 With respect to human rights in 
particular, Koh argues that  ‘ embed[ding] certain human rights principles into inter-
national and domestic law should trigger transnational interactions, that generate 
legal interpretations, that can in turn be internalized into the domestic law of even 
resistant nation states ’ . 28 
 Other scholars have analysed embeddedness as an aspect of an international tribu-
nal’s institutional design. In a study of the ECtHR and the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ), Anne-Marie Slaughter and I stressed the  ‘ supranational jurisdiction ’ of the two 
European Courts as a key ingredient of their success. 29 Such jurisdiction gives private 
parties direct access to the tribunals and  ‘ creat[es] a constituency for their judgments 
that is interested and able to pressure domestic government institutions to take heed 
and comply with those judgments ’ . 30 We also emphasized how  ‘ the judges on the 
ECJ and the ECHR have exploited the opportunities granted them by the provision 
of supranational jurisdiction ’ , in particular by forging relationships with the disag-
gregated branches of national governments.  ‘ The ECJ deliberately wooed national 
courts, and the ECHR earned support from courts, administrative agencies, and some 
national legislators. ’ 31 
 A later article by Robert Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, and Anne-Marie Slaughter 
identiﬁ ed embeddedness as one of three variables that inﬂ uences the effectiveness of 
international tribunals. 32 The study deﬁ ned embeddedness as  ‘ the extent to which dis-
pute resolution decisions can be implemented without governments having to take 
actions to do so ’ . 33 Such implementation is automatic where  ‘ autonomous national 
courts can enforce international judgments against their own governments ’ . 34 But it 
is also possible where a state  ‘ has incorporated or transposed [a treaty] into domestic 
 25  Koh,  ‘ How is International Human Rights Law Enforced? ’ , 74  Indiana LJ (1999) 1397, at 1403. 
 26  Koh,  ‘ On American Exceptionalism ’ , 55  Stanford L Rev (2003) 1479, at 1502. 
 27  Koh,  ‘ Transnational Legal Process ’ , 75  Nebraska L Rev (1996) 181, at 205, 204. 
 28  Koh, supra note 26, at 1502. 
 29  Helfer and Slaughter,  ‘ Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication ’ , 107  Yale LJ (1997) 
273, at 277. 
 30  Ibid ., at 387. 
 31  Ibid . 
 32  Keohane  et al. ,  ‘ Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational ’ , 54  Int’l Org (2000) 457. 
The two other variables are the tribunal’s access rules and its independence from the states subject to its 
jurisdiction. 
 33  Ibid ., at 458. 
 34  Ibid ., at 467. 
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law subject to the oversight of an autonomous domestic legal system ’ . 35 As an exam-
ple of the latter type of embeddedness, the authors cite the fact that  ‘ [m]any govern-
ments have  … incorporated the European Convention into domestic law, permitting 
individuals to enforce its provisions before domestic courts. Despite the lack of a direct 
link [between European and domestic judges], there is evidence that domestic courts 
tend to follow the jurisprudence of the ECHR in interpreting the Convention. ’ 36 
 B The Values of Embeddedness for the Strasbourg Supervisory System 
 Building upon these prior analyses, this section identiﬁ es and analyses the values of 
embeddedness as a principle for protecting the civil and political liberties enshrined in 
the European Convention. 
 At a practical level, embedding the regional human rights regime in national legal 
systems protects a larger number of individuals in a more expeditious fashion. Even 
after the reforms of Protocol No. 11, budget increases, and the appointment of addi-
tional Registry staff, review by the ECtHR remains a complex and time-consuming 
process. Thousands of individuals ﬁ le complaints with the Court too early (before 
exhausting domestic remedies) or too late (beyond the Convention’s six-month limi-
tations period), 37 a statistic that illustrates the widespread lack of knowledge about the 
Strasbourg system and the large pool of applicants whose possibly meritorious claims 
are beyond the ECtHR’s review. For applicants who successfully hurdle the treaty’s 
admissibility rules, there is a considerable delay before the Court issues a judgment 
on the merits. Indeed, it is something of an irony that the length of time cases remain 
pending before the ECtHR sometimes exceeds the maximum length of proceedings 
that the Convention allows in national courts. 38 
 Embeddedness also signiﬁ cantly improves the prospects for compliance with the 
European Convention. 39 It does so by enabling national courts to protect the Con-
vention’s civil and political liberties as incorporated into domestic law  – whether in 
the form of a self-executing treaty, the individual rights clauses of a constitution, or 
ordinary legislation. When Strasbourg rights and freedoms are fully domesticated in 
one of these ways, compliance with international law and national law approaches 
convergence. Stated differently, to the extent that a state accepts the rule of law at 
home, it also necessarily adheres to the rule of law internationally. Courts can further 
increase compliance (and pre-empt the ﬁ ling of potentially embarrassing complaints 
 35  Ibid ., at 468. 
 36  Ibid . 
 37  See Caﬂ isch,  supra note 3, at 405 (stating that the ECtHR rejects over 90% of complaints because the ap-
plicants cannot satisfy the Convention’s admissibility rules). 
 38  See European Convention,  supra note 1, Art. 6(1) (requiring a hearing to determine criminal charges 
and civil rights and obligations  ‘ within a reasonable time ’ );  S. Stavros,  The Guarantees for Accused Persons 
Under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (1993), at 77 – 115 (analysing the right to 
proceedings of a reasonable length). I am grateful to David Weissbrodt for drawing my attention to this 
arresting fact. 
 39  Whether embeddedness enhances member states ’ compliance with ECtHR judgments is a more complex 
subject that I address in the next section. 
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in Strasbourg) by providing remedies to individuals whose rights have been vio-
lated. 40 Moreover, embeddedness creates a dynamic compliance process. As discussed 
in greater detail below, courts often adjust their interpretation of the Convention as 
incorporated in domestic law in response to evolutions in ECtHR case law. 
 In addition to these practical beneﬁ ts, embeddedness is normatively desirable. The 
framers envisaged the European Convention not as a rigidly uniform charter but 
rather as  ‘ set[ting] a universal minimum standard which nonetheless  … allows some 
scope, albeit not unlimited, for properly functioning democracies to choose different 
solutions adapted to their different and evolving societies ’ . 41 It is precisely because 
 ‘ legally, politically, and culturally heterogeneous national governments can develop 
divergent but not necessarily incompatible approaches to common legal problems 
that the Court has afforded them a context-based zone of discretion when reviewing 
compliance with their treaty obligations and in balancing those obligations against 
other important interests ’ . 42 Seen from this perspective, embeddedness helps to pro-
mote a shared regional responsibility for protecting human rights, one that helps to 
create a European  ‘ community of law ’ 43 by  ‘ giv[ing] room to national institutions to 
appropriate the Convention and make it their own ’ . 44 
 C Direct and Diffuse Embeddedness Compared 
 The studies reviewed above identify the basic contours of embeddedness. But they do 
not fully capture the ways in which international courts can be entrenched in domes-
tic legal and political institutions. In this section, I provide a more ﬁ ne-grained analy-
sis of judicial embeddedness and apply it to the European human rights regime. A key 
component of this more nuanced approach is the distinction between  ‘ direct ’ and  ‘ dif-
fuse ’ embeddedness. The ECHR is not directly embedded in national legal systems. But 
its diffuse embeddedness in those systems provides the Court with numerous oppor-
tunities to inﬂ uence the decision-making of judges, legislators, and executive ofﬁ cials. 
It is those opportunities, I argue later in this article, that the Council of Europe should 
exploit when considering how to redesign the region’s human rights regime. 
 40  Cf. Kumm and Ferreres Comella,  ‘ The Primacy Clause of the Constitutional Treaty and the Future of Con-
stitutional Conﬂ ict in the European Union ’ , 3  Int’l J Const L (2005) 473, at 486 ( ‘ To prevent international 
embarrassment, both the national courts and the political branches feel that it is better to protect rights 
 “ at home, ” as it were ’ ). 
 41  Mahoney,  ‘ Universality versus Subsidiarity in the Strasbourg Case Law on Free Speech: Explaining Some 
Recent Judgments ’ [1997]  European Human Rts L Rev 364, at 369. 
 42  Helfer,  ‘ Adjudicating Copyright Claims under the TRIPs Agreement: the Case for a European Human 
Rights Analogy ’ , 39  Harvard Int’l LJ (1998) 357, at 396; see also  Sunday Times v. United Kingdom , ECtHR, 
Series A No. 30 (1979), at para. 61 ( ‘ [T]he main purpose of the Convention is to lay down certain inter-
national standards to be observed by the Contracting States in their relations with persons under their 
jurisdiction. This does not mean absolute uniformity is required and, indeed, since the Contracting States 
remain free to choose the measures which they consider appropriate, the Court cannot be oblivious of the 
substantive or procedural features of their respective domestic laws ’ ) (internal quotations omitted). 
 43  Helfer and Slaughter,  supra note 29, at 367 – 373, 389 – 391. 
 44  Carozza,  supra note 8, at 75. 
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 Consider direct embeddedness ﬁ rst. The ECtHR does not occupy a formal place in 
the judicial hierarchies of the European Convention’s member states. It has no appel-
late jurisdiction to review the decisions of national courts, nor is there any mechanism 
for judges to refer to Strasbourg questions of human rights law that arise during the 
course of domestic litigation. The Court cannot quash national court rulings nor order 
national governments to amend legislation or revise administrative practices. 45 In 
addition, ECtHR judgments are, with only two exceptions, not  ‘ executable within  … 
domestic legal systems ’ . 46 Thus, if an international tribunal’s embeddedness is char-
acterized by its inclusion in an integrated judicial hierarchy  – what I label as  ‘ direct ’ 
embeddedness  – the ECHR is not embedded in national legal systems. This provides 
a sharp contrast with the ECJ, which, as a result of the preliminary reference proce-
dure and the doctrines of supremacy and direct effect, occupies a place at the apex 
of the judicial systems in all European Union Member States with respect to issues of 
EU law. 47 
 Although the ECtHR lacks direct embeddedness, it has numerous characteristics of 
 ‘ diffuse ’ embeddedness. A diffusely embedded international tribunal employs a variety 
of mechanisms to inﬂ uence the behaviour of national decision-makers. The efﬁ cacy of 
these tools hinges not on the coercive power that a higher court exercises over a lower 
judicial body. Rather, it requires the skilful use of persuasion to realign the interests 
and incentives of decision-makers in favour of compliance with the tribunals ’ judg-
ments. In this sense, diffuse embeddedness is linked to the socializing functions that 
international institutions can exert over the behaviour of national actors. 48 
 Several design features of the European human rights regime reﬂ ect the ECtHR’s dif-
fuse embeddedness in national legal systems. First, the Court frequently reviews chal-
lenges to domestic judicial decisions that interpret and apply constitutions, legislation, 
and administrative practices. When Strasbourg judges conclude that these decisions 
violate one or more Convention-protected liberties, states must, whenever possible, 
restore the complainant to the position he or she occupied prior to the  violation. To 
 45  See, e.g. , Saïdi v. France, ECtHR, Series A No. 261-C, at 57 (1993); Wildhaber,  supra note 6, at 162. 
 46  Ress,  ‘ The Effect of Decisions and Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in the Domestic 
Legal Order ’ , 40  Texas Int’l LJ (2005) 359, at 374. Until recently, the Netherlands was the only member 
state in which ECtHR judgments could be executed in the same manner as domestic judicial rulings:  ibid. 
(noting this fact and stating that  ‘ the situation in the Netherlands is an absolute singularity ’ ). In 2006, 
the Ukraine adopted a statute and a Presidential decree to follow the same approach. See Sviriba,  ‘ Enforc-
ing Judgments of the ECHR ’ , Magister & Partners, International Law Ofﬁ ce (12 Sept. 2006), available 
at:  www.magisters.com/publication.php?publicationid=33 (stating that under the new laws  ‘ an ECHR 
judgment against [the Ukraine] now constitutes an executive document in itself and can be ﬁ led directly 
for enforcement ’ ). 
 47  Some national constitutional courts have refused to surrender to the ECJ their authority over the inter-
face between domestic constitutions and EU law, instead negotiating a cooperative relationship with the 
judges in Luxembourg: see Hoffmeister,  ‘ Germany: Status of European Convention on Human Rights in 
Domestic Law ’ , 4  Int’l J Const L (2006) 722, at 730. In practice, however, even the most assertive of these 
courts  – the German Constitutional Court  – has never held an ECJ judgment to be invalid:  ibid . 
 48  See Goodman and Jinks,  ‘ How to Inﬂ uence States: Socialization and International Human Rights ’ , 54 
 Duke LJ (2004) 621, at 635 – 638. 
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meet this obligation, national governments have quashed criminal convictions, expe-
dited trials, and re-opened closed judicial proceedings. 49 
 In this sense, ECtHR judgments do modify and overturn the rulings of domes-
tic courts. But achieving these outcomes requires the afﬁ rmative intervention of a 
state’s political branches, and the Court has traditionally avoided policing such inter-
ventions. As I explain below, however, the ECtHR has recently begun to identify rem-
edies with greater speciﬁ city and to scrutinize more intensively how states enforce its 
judgments. 50 
 A second dimension of diffuse embeddedness concerns the relationship between the 
ECtHR and national parliaments. Consistent with the Strasbourg supervisory system’s 
lack of direct embeddedness, the Court’s judgments are binding only as a matter of 
international law and only upon the parties to the dispute. 51 But their practical effects 
are often more extensive. Parliamentarians across Europe sometimes consult ECtHR 
case law when drafting and revising statutes and administrative regulations. 52 When 
these consultations occur, they extend the Court’s inﬂ uence even in the absence of 
an adverse judgment against the state. 53 There is no obligation, however, for govern-
ment decision-makers to give ECHR judgments this  erga omnes effect. 54 This is so even 
for Systemic human rights problems that adversely affect numerous individuals. As I 
explain below, however, the ECtHR has recently developed a mechanism to address 
such systemic violations, one that will increase the dialogue between the Court and 
national parliaments. 
 A third manifestation of diffuse embeddedness relates to the common legal texts 
that the ECtHR and national courts interpret. For the ﬁ rst few decades of the Con-
vention’s life, its member states were divided into two camps  – those that had incor-
porated the treaty into domestic law and those that had not. In the latter group of 
countries, domestic courts could not provide a remedy to individuals whose rights had 
been violated. These states fulﬁ lled their treaty obligations by giving effect to ECtHR 
judgments on a case-by-case basis. 55 As the Strasbourg system matured, the number 
of incorporation countries increased so that, by the early years of the new  millennium, 
 49  See Committee of Ministers,  List of Individual Measures Adopted , H/Exec (2006) 2 (Apr. 2006) (compre-
hensively listing the measures that member states have adopted following adverse ECtHR judgments to 
remedy the effects of Convention violations for individual applicants). 
 50  See  infra Part 3C. 
 51  See European Convention,  supra note 1, Art. 53(1) ( ‘ The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by 
the ﬁ nal judgment of the Court in a case to which they are parties ’ ). 
 52  See Barkuysen and van Emmerik,  ‘ A Comparative View on the Execution of Judgments of the European 
Court of Human Rights ’ , in T. Christou and J.P. Raymond (eds),  European Court of Human Rights: Remedies 
and Execution of Judgments (2005), at 1, 15, 19 . 
 53  See  ibid ., at 12 (describing revisions several legislative initiatives in the Netherlands relating to the right 
to property, the content of which  ‘ was motivated by the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol 1  … as 
interpreted in the case law of the [ECtHR] ’ ). 
 54  See Ress,  supra note 46, at 374 (stating that  ‘ judgments of the [ECtHR] do not have an erga omnes effect, 
but they have an orientation effect ’ ); see also Greer,  supra note 3, at 279 (stating that the  ‘ orthodox view ’ 
is that  ‘ any state is obliged to observe  only those judgments made directly against it ’ ). 
 55  See  A. Drzemczewski,  The European Human Rights Convention in Domestic Law (1983), at 260 – 303. 
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the Convention had  ‘ become an integral part of the domestic legal orders of all states 
parties ’ . 56 This integration enables national courts to apply the treaty directly as 
embodied in domestic law. 
 There is, however, no necessary correlation between the continent-wide incorp-
oration of the Convention and the embeddedness of ECtHR judgments. As the treaty 
has come to stand on a ﬁ rmer domestic footing, judges have paid greater attention 
to the growing number of international cases interpreting it. Yet consistently with 
the ECHR’s lack of direct embeddedness, domestic courts have reserved to themselves 
at least a modicum of independent interpretive authority. This judicial independence 
exists even in states in which the Convention is on a par with the constitution. Accord-
ing to former ECtHR Judge Georg Ress, it may seem obvious that national courts in 
such countries would  ‘ feel obliged to scrupulously follow any reasoning of the ECHR ’ . 
In fact, he explains, there is: 
 a difference between the Convention as part of the constitution and the Convention as an inter-
national treaty interpreted by the ECHR. Within the domestic legal order, the Convention is 
only one element in the mosaic of different constitutional provisions and its interpretation in 
that context may differ considerably from an interpretation based on the Convention alone. 57 
 As a result of this distinction, domestic courts may not  ‘ fully follow the reasoning of 
the ECHR ’ if it does not accord with the text and  aquis of national law. 58 The result, 
in short, is that ECtHR judgments are persuasive authority. They are highly persua-
sive, to be sure. But they retain their status as interpretations of international law 
until they have been domesticated by national courts. 59 Whether such domestication 
in fact occurs may depend on which judge hears the case. Constitutional courts in 
Europe have a consistent track record of taking Strasbourg case law seriously. Lower 
tribunals, by contrast, have shown a decided  ‘ lack of enthusiasm ’ for applying the 
Convention as interpreted by the ECtHR. 60 The challenge the Strasbourg tribunal 
 56  Appendix to Recommendation Rec(2004)6 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the im-
provement of domestic remedies (12 May 2004), at 3 – 4. This new unity harbours a diversity of a different 
sort. In two or three countries, the treaty has supra-constitutional status or is on a par with the national 
constitution. The remaining states are divided between those in which the Convention is inferior to the 
constitution but superior to domestic statutes and those in which it is equivalent to ordinary legislation. 
See Hoffmeister,  supra note 47, at 726 – 728; Ress,  supra note 46, at 375 – 376. 
 57  Ress,  supra note 46, at 376. 
 58  Ibid . 
 59  This view is conﬁ rmed by a 2002 conference of European constitutional courts at which 21 such courts 
 ‘ declare[d] themselves not bound by the rulings of the [ECHR] ’ , but an even larger number noted  ‘ the 
preponderant inﬂ uence of [Strasbourg] case law  … when it comes to determining the substance of the 
basic rights guaranteed by internal law and the extent of the restrictions that can be placed on them ’ : 
Conference of European Constitutional Courts, XIIth Congress,  General Report: The relations between the 
Constitutional Courts and the other national courts, including the interference in this area of the action of the 
European courts (14 – 16 May 2002), at 48. 
 60  Ibid ., at 50. The general report noted two reasons for this reluctance: ﬁ rst, that lower courts  ‘ prefer to base 
their decisions on regulations of internal law rather than on international provisions ’ ; and, secondly, 
that analysing ECtHR case law seemed  ‘ pointless ’ where the same rights had been recognized by both the 
Convention and the constitution:  ibid . 
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faces, therefore, is how to encourage judges at all levels of domestic judicial systems to 
follow its jurisprudence. 
 D Distinguishing Embeddedness from Constitutional and 
Individual Justice 
 Claims that the ECtHR is a  sui generis international tribunal have a distinguished aca-
demic pedigree. The Court itself has fuelled these claims by interpreting the Convention 
not as set of reciprocal promises among nations, but, far more momentously, as a  ‘ con-
stitutional instrument of European public order ’ . 61 The ECtHR maintains that order by 
calibrating the proper balance between independent judicial review and deference to 
national decision-makers. On the one hand, the Court stresses the subsidiary nature 
of the treaty’s  ‘ supervision machinery ’ in relation to  ‘ national human rights protec-
tion systems ’ . 62 Once a dispute comes before it, however, the ECtHR reviews domestic 
legislation, administrative practices, and judicial rulings using distinctive methods of 
treaty analysis  – such as the doctrine of effectiveness, the principle of autonomous 
interpretation, and an evolving understanding of protected rights and freedoms. 63 
Over time, the Court has manipulated these jurisprudential tools to engender  ‘ a slow 
but constant change of the sphere of sovereignty of the modern [European] state ’ . 64 As 
a result of this incremental erosion of state power, many scholars now argue that the 
ECtHR has transformed itself into a regional constitutional court. 65 
 The consequences of this appellation are muddied, however, by the multiplicity of 
meanings associated with constitutional courts and constitutional review. At the most 
basic level, labelling the ECtHR as a constitutional court merely acknowledges that 
Strasbourg judges test the validity of legislation against higher-order rules protecting 
individual rights, much as do their domestic counterparts. 66 A second, more sophisti-
cated approach deﬁ nes constitutional review as a method of judicial decision-making. 
Seen in this light, the ECtHR pursues  ‘ constitutional justice ’ when it adjudicates on 
cases that contribute  ‘ to the identiﬁ cation, condemnation, and resolution of [Conven-
tion] violations  … which are serious for the applicant, for the respondent state  … or 
 61  Loizidou v. Turkey , 310 ECtHR, Series A No 310 (1995), at 27. 
 62  Sadik v. Greece, 24 EHRR (1996) 323, at 339. 
 63  For a discussion of the Court’s interpretive methodologies see Helfer,  supra note 42, at 401 – 407; 
 Mowbray,  ‘ The Creativity of the European Court of Human Rights ’ , 5  Human Rts L Rev 57, (2005) 60. 
 64  Ress,  supra note 46, at 364. 
 65  See, e.g. , Alkema,  ‘ The European Convention as a Constitution and its Court as a Constitutional Court ’ , 
in P. Mahoney  et al. (eds),  Protecting Human Rights: The European Perspective (2000), at 41; Cameron, 
 ‘ Protocol 11 to the European Convention on Human Rights: The European Court of Human Rights as a 
Constitutional Court? ’ , 15  YB Eur L (1995) 219, at 236 – 237, 243 – 244; Cours Européenne des Droits de 
L’homme et Cours Constitutionnelles (2005), available at:  www.oboulo.com/cours-europeenne- droits-
homme-cours-constitutionnelles-13715.html ; Greer,  ‘ Constitutionalizing Adjudication under the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights ’ , 23  Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2003) 405; Wildhaber,  supra 
note 6, at 162 – 163. 
 66  Cameron,  supra note 65, at 223 – 224; Flauss,  ‘ La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme est-elle une 
Cour constitutionnelle? ’ , 36  Revue Française de Droit Constitutionnel (1998) 711, at 711 – 728. 
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for Europe as a whole ’ . 67 A third perspective sees the ECtHR as a constitutional court 
when it acts didactically, shaping its case law to socialize domestic institutions to the 
democratic and rule of law values that the Convention embodies. 68 These three views 
of the Strasbourg system’s constitutional functions contrast with an  ‘ individual jus-
tice ’ conception of human rights adjudication, in which the ECtHR  ‘ ensure[s] that 
every genuine victim of a violation receives a judgment in [its] favour from the Court, 
however slight the injury, whatever the bureaucratic cost, whether or not compensa-
tion is awarded, and whatever the likely impact of the judgment on the conduct or 
practice in question ’ . 69 
 What, then, are the differences between the constitutional and individual justice 
approaches on the one hand and, on the other, the embeddedness principle advocated 
in this article? Analysing the ECtHR as embedded in national legal systems differs from 
the individual justice approach in its recognition that the Court’s continent-wide geo-
graphic and demographic reach makes it impossible to remedy every violation of the 
Convention. It also shares with those who conceptualize the ECtHR as a constitutional 
court the belief that Strasbourg judges should be strategic in selecting cases to advance 
a normative vision of the Convention and its supervisory machinery. But it parts com-
pany with constitutional justice adherents regarding the substance of that vision. 
 Constitutional justice proponents urge the ECtHR to develop trans-jurisdictional 
solutions for weighty human rights problems rather than focus on plaintiff- or  country-
speciﬁ c issues. In contrast, an embeddedness perspective seeks ﬁ rst and foremost to 
augment the mechanisms available to remedy human rights violations in national 
law, obviating the need for individuals to seek relief at the regional level. Where these 
national mechanisms are inadequate, the ECtHR should increase its supervision of 
domestic courts and political bodies and provide incentives for government actors faith-
fully to follow the Court’s case law and to remedy Convention violations at home. 
 Admittedly, the two perspectives overlap if embeddedness is itself treated as a prin-
ciple of constitutional magnitude. But most constitutional court advocates do not 
view the ECtHR’s constitutional functions as extending so broadly. Setting aside this 
deﬁ nitional alignment, there are many issues where embeddedness and constitu-
tional justice approaches are likely to diverge. These include, for example, cases of 
only minor value for explaining novel or unsettled interpretations of civil and political 
rights but much greater signiﬁ cance for enhancing the penetration of the Convention 
and ECtHR case law into national legal systems. In addition, whereas constitutional 
justice scholars focus almost exclusively on the work of the Court, an embeddedness 
approach gives equal weight to the activities of the Council of Europe’s political and 
expert bodies. 
 67  Greer,  supra note 3, at 166; see also Wildhaber,  supra note 6, at 162 – 163 (describing the Court’s  ‘ consti-
tutional ’ mission as  ‘ determining issues on public policy grounds in the general interest ’ and extending 
its  ‘ jurisprudence throughout the community of Convention States ’ ). 
 68  Harmsen,  ‘ The European Convention on Human Rights After Enlargement ’ , 5  Int’l J Human Rts (2001) 
18, at 32 – 33; see also Cameron,  supra note 65, at 252 (emphasizing the Court’s future  ‘ pedagogical ’ role 
in the  ‘ creation of a legal culture ’ when reviewing cases from former Soviet Bloc countries). 
 69  Greer,  supra note 3, at 166 (articulating but not endorsing this approach). 
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 An additional concrete example may help to illustrate the differences between an 
embedded court and a constitutional court. 70 The legal system in post-Second World 
War Italy gave the Italian Constitutional Court exclusive authority to determine 
whether domestic legislation was compatible with Italy’s foundational charter. 71 But 
it also separated the court from the country’s ordinary and administrative tribunals 
and its political processes. 72 As a result of this formal separation, the Constitutional 
Court initially found it difﬁ cult to exercise its powers of review. The court faced stiff 
resistance from other divisions of the judiciary, which were  ‘ reluctant to acknowledge 
[its] authority ’ or refer cases to the court. 73 In addition, the Italian Parliament was 
often unaware of or disregarded those few rulings that the court issued. 74 Stated differ-
ently, the Italian Constitutional Court was not embedded in the Italian legal system. 
 In response to this state of affairs, the Constitutional Court  ‘ began to use its power in 
a very pervasive way ’ to expand its jurisdiction and to develop a productive relation-
ship with lower-level tribunals. 75 When the court found a statute unconstitutional, 
the Italian Constitution prescribed a single response  – strike the statute down. But the 
court slowly extended the available remedies to include  ‘ declaring a law partially void ’ , 
replacing  ‘ one or more words in the law with other words in order to make the same 
statute conform to the Constitution ’ , or interpreting a statute to avoid constitutional 
inﬁ rmity. 76 In addition, the court encouraged ordinary and administrative tribunals to 
identify constitutional questions and refer them for a deﬁ nitive ruling. 77 This process 
 ‘ implicate[d] ordinary judges in the constitutional review process ’ by giving them  ‘ a 
share in the task of safeguarding the constitution against offensive legislation ’ . 78 But it 
did so  ‘ in a moderate way ’ that preserved the Constitutional Court’s ultimate author-
ity. 79 As the court’s powers increased, so too did the Italian Parliament’s acceptance of 
constitutional constraints on domestic lawmaking. 80 As a result of these interrelated 
developments, over the course of several decades the Italian  Constitutional Court 
 70  I thank Elizabeth Sepper, NYU School of Law, JD 2007 and LL.M 2008, for drawing my attention to this 
example. 
 71  See La Pergola and Del Duca,  ‘ Community Law, International Law and the Italian Constitution ’ , 79  AJIL 
(1985) 598, at 604. 
 72  See Baldassarre,  ‘ Structure and Organization of the Constitutional Court of Italy ’ , 40  St Louis Univ LJ 
(1996) 649, at 650. 
 73  See Volcansek,  ‘ Judicial Activism in Italy ’ , in K.M. Holland (ed.),  Judicial Activism in Comparative Perspec-
tive (1991), at 117, 120; Nardini,  ‘ Passive Activism and the Limits of Judicial Self Restraint: Lessons for 
America from the Italian Constitutional Court ’ , 30  Seton Hall L Rev (1999) 1, at 42 n. 18. 
 74  See Volcansek,  ‘ Judicial Review and Public Policy in Italy: American Roots and the Italian Hybrid ’ , in 
D.W. Jackson and C.N. Tate (eds),  Comparative Judicial Review and Public Policy (1992), at 89, 98. 
 75  Baldassarre,  supra note 72, at 652 – 654. 
 76  Ibid .; Nardini,  supra note 73, at 18. 
 77  See Ferejohn and Pasquino,  ‘ Constitutional Adjudication: Lessons from Europe ’ , 82  Texas L Rev (2004) 
1671, at 1689. 
 78  Ibid .; Cornella,  ‘ The European Model of Constitutional Review of Legislation: Toward Decentralization? ’ , 
2  Int’l J Const L (2004) 461, at 472 – 473. 
 79  Ferejohn and Pasquino,  supra note 77, at 1689. 
 80  See Volcansek,  supra note 74 , at 98 (noting that the Parliament has created an ofﬁ ce dedicated to evalu-
ating the Constitutional Court’s decisions and formulating an appropriate response). 
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embedded itself in the country’s legal and political systems and  ‘ profoundly modiﬁ ed 
the traditional way of making and applying law typical of Italian legal culture ’ . 81 
 In the discussion that follows, I document several ways in which the ECtHR is fol-
lowing an analogous trajectory, modifying its jurisprudence and expanding its review 
powers to embed itself more ﬁ rmly in the national legal systems of the Convention’s 
member states. 
 3 The Council of Europe’s Response to the ECtHR’s Docket 
Crisis and Examples of Increasing Embeddedness in Recent 
ECHR Jurisprudence
 The current drive to reform the Strasbourg supervisory system dates back to a Novem-
ber 2000 ministerial conference marking the ﬁ ftieth anniversary of the signing of the 
European Convention. The recent entry into force of Protocol No. 11 in 1998 had 
transformed the ECtHR into  ‘ a truly permanent, professional judicial body ’ . 82 Only 
two years later, however, the ministers issued a troubling announcement, warning 
that  ‘ the effectiveness of the Convention system  … is now at issue ’ because of  ‘ the dif-
ﬁ culties that the Court has encountered in dealing with the ever-increasing volume 
of applications ’ . 83 
 As noted above, two factors were principally responsible for the rising number of 
complaints: (1) the accession of former Soviet bloc countries whose transitions to 
democracy were often slow and ﬁ tful; and (2) systemic human rights problems in 
longstanding Convention member states. 84 The ministers ’ call for a response to the 
ECtHR’s looming docket crisis was answered by convening several committees and 
working groups to study the problem and propose potential solutions. 
 The most tangible result of their efforts was Protocol No. 14, 85 adopted in May 2004 
and now ratiﬁ ed by 46 of 47 member states. 86 The Protocol’s major features are: (1) a 
procedure for single judges to decide manifestly inadmissible cases; (2) a new admis-
sibility standard that authorizes the dismissal of complaints whose authors have not 
suffered  ‘ signiﬁ cant disadvantage ’ ; (3) provisions to facilitate friendly  settlements; 
 81  Pizzorusso,  ‘ Italian and American Models of the Judiciary and of Judicial Review of Legislation: A Com-
parison of Recent Tendencies ’ , 38  Am J Comp L (1990) 374, at 385 – 386; Pizzorusso,  ‘ Constitutional 
Review and Legislation in Italy ’ , in C. Landfried (ed.),  Constitutional Review & Legislation: An International 
Comparison (1988), at 109, 126. 
 82  Caﬂ ish,  supra note 3, at 403. 
 83  European Ministerial Conference on Human Rights, Resolution I, Institutional and Functional Arrange-
ments for the Protection of Human Rights at National and European Level (Rome, 3 – 4 Nov. 2000). 
 84  See Res. 1226, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Execution of Judgments of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights (2000), at para. 7. 
 85  Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
amending the control system of the Convention, ETS No. 194, opened for signature 13 May 2004. 
 86  Russia is the only hold-out. In Dec. 2006 the State Duma refused to ratify the treaty. I discuss the signiﬁ -
cance of Russia’s (perhaps temporary) refusal to ratify Protocol No. 14 in Part 4C. 
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and (4) measures to improve the execution of the Court’s judgments. 87 The drafters 
believe that Protocol No. 14 will ameliorate the Court’s docket crisis. They recognize, 
however, that it is only one component of a multi-dimensional, long-term reform 
strategy. 88 
 Consistently with that intent and even before the adoption of Protocol No. 14, 
the ECHR started to respond to the underlying causes of the surge in applications by 
modifying its jurisprudence in three ways. First, the Court adopted the role of a ﬁ rst-
instance ﬁ nder of fact where states failed to investigate alleged human rights viola-
tions. Secondly, the ECtHR expanded its interpretation of Article 13 of the Convention, 
a provision that requires an effective domestic remedy for violations of protected rights 
and freedoms. Thirdly, Strasbourg judges, in a stark reversal of past practice, began to 
specify remedies that national governments must provide to individuals whose rights 
they have violated. The most notable consequence of this change was the ECtHR’s 
creation of a  ‘ pilot judgment ’ procedure to address systemic human rights problems 
affecting large numbers of similarly situated individuals. As I explain below, each of 
these three jurisprudential shifts has increased the Court’s diffuse embeddedness in 
national legal systems. 
 A The ECHR as First Instance Tribunal and Fact Finder 
 The subsidiarity principle that infuses the Convention’s supervisory system restricts 
the ECtHR’s relationship to the national authorities whose decisions it reviews. The 
Court often repeats the mantra that it cannot  ‘ assume the role ’ 89 nor  ‘ take the place 
of ’ those authorities. 90 This prohibition applies with particular force to domestic judi-
cial proceedings. The ECtHR refuses to  ‘ act as a court of appeal, or as sometimes is 
said, as a court of fourth instance from the decisions taken by domestic courts ’ . 91 It 
generally refrains from interpreting domestic laws and it defers to national courts ’ 
assessments of  ‘ the credibility of witnesses and the relevance of evidence to the issues 
in the case ’ . 92 
 The Court scrupulously follows these principles when reviewing the actions of 
domestic decision-makers in well-functioning democracies. But its responsibility to 
 87  For detailed analyses of Protocol No. 14 see Caﬂ isch,  supra note 3, at 407 – 412; Beernaert,  ‘ Protocol 14 
and New Strasbourg Procedures: Toward Greater Efﬁ ciency and at What Price? ’ [2004]  Eur Human Rts L 
Rev 544, at 547 – 555; Mowbray,  ‘ Protocol 14 to the European Convention on Human Rights and Recent 
Strasbourg Cases ’ , 4  Human Rts L Rev (2004) 331, at 331 – 335. 
 88  Council of Europe,  Explanatory Report to Protocol No 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms amending the control system of the Convention (13 May 2004), at para. 14 ( ‘ Only 
a comprehensive set of interdependent measures tackling the problem from different angles will make it 
possible to overcome the Court’s present overload ’ ). 
 89  Belgian Linguistics Case , ECtHR, Series A No. 6 (1968), at 35. 
 90  Observer and Guardian v. United Kingdom , ECtHR, Series A No. 216 (1991), at 30. 
 91  App. Nos 29458/04 and 29465/04,  Sokurenko and Strygun v. Ukraine (2006), at 13 (joint dissenting 
opinion of Judges Lorenzen and Maruste). 
 92  Ibid . (citing  Vidal v. Belgium, ECtHR, Series A No. 235-B, at para. 32;  Edwards v. United Kingdom , ECtHR, 
Series A No. 247-B (1992), at para. 34. 
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adjudicate Convention violations applies with equal force where a government fails 
to investigate alleged human rights abuses or to provide a judicial forum for appli-
cants to substantiate their claims. In such cases  – which often involve widespread 
civil unrest  – the ECtHR  ‘ inevitably confront[s]  … the same difﬁ culties as those faced 
by any  ﬁ rst-instance court ’ . 93 It must review the parties ’ conﬂ icting accounts and 
establish the relevant facts. It must create appropriate evidentiary rules and deter-
mine the burden and standard of proof necessary to substantiate a violation of the 
Convention. And it must decide how to proceed when the government has exclusive 
access to information that may corroborate or refute the applicant’s allegations but 
fails to provide that information to the Court. 94 
 The ECtHR’s ﬁ rst sustained treatment of these issues arose in cases involving human 
rights abuses by military and police ofﬁ cials in the Kurdish regions of south-eastern 
Turkey. In the latter half of the 1990s, complaints alleging forced disappearances, 
extrajudicial killings, torture of detainees, and destruction of villages in these regions 
began to arrive in Strasbourg. In response, the ECtHR (and before it the European 
Human Rights Commission)  ‘ regularly undertook fact-ﬁ nding missions for the purpose 
of taking depositions from witnesses ’ and inspecting the locations where the alleged 
violations had occurred.  ‘ Thus, even when presented with conﬂ icting accounts of the 
events or with the Government’s eventual lack of cooperation, the Court  … could 
draw factual conclusions bas[ed] on those ﬁ rst-hand testimonies, to which particular 
importance was attached. ’ 95 
 The ECtHR and the Commission assumed these new tasks with hesitation, recogniz-
ing that they  ‘ must be cautious in taking on the role of a ﬁ rst-instance tribunal of fact, 
where this is not rendered unavoidable by the circumstances of a particular case ’ . 96 
The tribunals openly acknowledged the challenges of ﬁ rst instance fact- ﬁ nding, 
including the inability to compel witnesses to appear or testify at hearings, 97 language 
problems, and the  ‘ lack of detailed and direct familiarity with the conditions pertain-
ing in the region ’ . 98 
 Over time, however, the ECtHR became more conﬁ dent in exercising these fact-
ﬁ nding powers. Faced with repeated allegations of ﬂ agrant violations of the right to 
life and the prohibition of torture and degrading or inhuman treatment or punish-
ment, the Court applied  ‘ a particularly thorough scrutiny ’ even where  ‘ there have 
been criminal proceedings in the domestic court[s] concerning [the applicant’s] alle-
gations ’ 99 or where  ‘ certain domestic proceedings and investigations have already 
taken place ’ . 100 At the same time, however, the Court also hinted that it would adopt 
 93  App No 7615/02,  Imakayeva v. Russia (2006), at para. 111. 
 94  Ibid ., at paras 111 – 115. 
 95  Ibid ., at para. 117 (summarizing case law involving human rights violations in Turkey). 
 96  E.g. App. No. 25657/94,  Av ş ar v. Turkey , ECHR 2001-VII, at para. 283. 
 97  App. No. 65899/01,  Tani ş v. Turkey (2005), at para. 160(c). 
 98  App. No. 23819/94,  Bilgin v. Turkey (2000), at para. 66. 
 99  Av ş ar v. Turkey ,  supra note 96, at para. 183. 
 100  E.g. , App. No. 21689/93,  Ahmet Özkan v. Turkey (2004), at para. 84. 
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a more deferential posture if Turkish ofﬁ cials more thoroughly investigated such 
cases. 101 
 The ECtHR’s decision to take on the role of a ﬁ rst instance domestic court 
 ‘ represent[ed] a signiﬁ cant redeﬁ nition of the institution’s role ’ . 102 In such cases 
 – which now include complaints alleging extrajudicial killings, forced disappear-
ances, and torture in the Chechnya region of Russia 103  – the Court  ‘ ceases to be a 
secondary guarantor of human rights and instead ﬁ nds itself in a more crucial  – and 
exposed  – front-line position ’ . 104 Scholars have questioned whether the ECtHR pos-
sesses the resources and institutional qualiﬁ cations necessary to carry out these func-
tions. 105 But there is little doubt that this exception to the subsidiarity principle reﬂ ects 
the Court’s commitment to closing gaps in domestic accountability where member 
states insufﬁ ciently investigate credible claims of serious human violations. 106 
 B Enhancing Effective Domestic Remedies for Convention Violations 
 In addition to its many substantive provisions, the European Convention contains, 
in Article 13, a requirement that member states provide  ‘ an effective remedy before a 
national authority ’ to  ‘ [e]veryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the treaty] 
are violated ’ . 107 The ECtHR has signiﬁ cantly expanded the scope of this  ‘ obscure ’ 108 
provision in recent years, encouraging states to augment existing domestic remedies 
and create new ones tailored to the violation of different civil and political liberties. 
 The ECtHR adopted a rather restrictive approach to Article 13 in its early judg-
ments. It refused to interpret the provision to mandate either domestic incorporation of 
the  Convention or judicial remedies. 109 Nevertheless, the Court required an  ‘ effective ’ 
 101  See, e.g. , Av ş ar v. Turkey, supra note 96, at para. 283 ( ‘ Where domestic proceedings have taken place , it is not 
the Court’s task to substitute its own assessment of the facts for that of the domestic courts and as a general 
rule it is for those courts to assess the evidence before them ’ ) (emphasis added); App. No. 51480/99,  Eri-
kan Bulut v. Turkey (2006), at paras 39 – 43 (holding that police ofﬁ cials had conducted an adequate inves-
tigation into the applicant’s defenestration); App. No. 41964/98,  Cennet Ayhan and Mehmet Salih Ayhan v. 
Turkey (2006), at para. 83 (rejecting the applicants ’ attempt to prove a Convention violation by relying on 
a government report of an investigation of the causes of unrest in south-eastern Turkey, and character-
izing the report as  ‘ a serious attempt to provide information on and analyse problems associated with the 
ﬁ ght against terrorism from a general perspective and to recommend  … investigative measures ’ ). 
 102  Harmsen,  supra note 68, at 29. 
 103  See, e.g.,  Imakayeva v. Russia, supra note 93, at paras 117 – 119. 
 104  Harmsen,  supra note 68, at 29. 
 105  See Kamminga,  ‘ Is the European Convention on Human Rights Sufﬁ ciently Equipped to Cope with Gross 
and Systematic Violations? ’ , 12  Neth Q Human Rts (1994) 153. 
 106  See App. No. 22494/93,  Hasan  İ lhan v. Turkey (2004), at para. 123 (stating that  ‘ defects ’ in the  ‘ inves-
tigatory system ’ in  ‘ south-east Turkey in the ﬁ rst half of the 1990s ’  ‘ undermined the effectiveness of 
criminal-law protection ’ and  ‘ fostered a lack of accountability of members of the security forces for their 
actions which was not compatible with the rule of law in a democratic society ’ ). 
 107  European Convention,  supra note 1, Art. 13. 
 108  Malone v. United Kingdom , ECtHR, Series A No. 82 (1984), at 37 (partly dissenting opinion of Judges Match-
er and Pinheiro Farinha) (stating that Art. 13  ‘ constitutes one of the most obscure clauses in the Conven-
tion and that its application raises extremely difﬁ cult and complicated problems of  interpretation ’ ). 
 109  See  Silver v. United Kingdom , ECtHR, Series A No. 61 (1983), at para. 113;  Swedish Engine Drivers ’ Union 
v. Sweden , ECtHR, Series A No. 20 (1984), at para. 50. 
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 mechanism or mechanisms to review  ‘ arguable ’ claims that the government had 
violated the Convention or analogous provisions of national law. Such mechanisms 
had to be independent of the ofﬁ cials or bodies that committed the alleged violation, 
effective in practice as well as in law, capable of investigating allegations fully, and 
authorized to make legally binding decisions granting relief to aggrieved individuals. 110 
Although these cumulative requirements suggest a robust view of domestic remedies, 
the ECtHR’s early application of these principles rarely resulted in a ﬁ nding of an  Article 
13 violation. 111 
 In recent years, however, the Court has more rigorously scrutinized claims that 
governments have failed to provide effective domestic remedies. The ECtHR has, for 
example, found violations of Article 13 even after concluding that the state had not 
breached the substantive right that formed the basis of the applicant’s complaint. 112 It 
has  ‘ strictly examined the powers, procedures and independence of non-judicial bod-
ies when evaluating if they provide effective remedies under Article 13 ’ . 113 And it has 
emphasized that  ‘ the requirements of Article 13  … take the form of a guarantee ’ that 
is  ‘ one of the fundamental principles of a democratic society ’ . 114 
 Tailoring domestic remedies to  ‘ the nature of the applicant’s complaint ’ is among 
the more signiﬁ cant developments in Article 13 jurisprudence. 115  ‘ [I]n cases of suspi-
cious death or ill-treatment ’ , for example, the ECtHR has held that the  ‘ fundamental 
importance ’ of the right to life and the prohibition of torture require  ‘ a thorough and 
effective investigation capable of leading to the identiﬁ cation and punishment of those 
responsible for the acts of ill-treatment ’ . 116 Similarly, in asylum and deportation cases, 
the Court has stressed  ‘ the irreversible nature of the harm that might occur if the risk 
of torture or ill-treatment alleged [by the applicant] materialised ’ . It has accordingly 
interpreted Article 13 to require the government to suspend deportation proceedings 
pending an  ‘ independent and rigorous scrutiny ’ of the applicant’s claims. 117 
 To determine whether states have satisﬁ ed their Article 13 obligations, the ECtHR 
has carefully analysed domestic remedies, often in excruciating detail. 118 Such 
 110  See A. R. Mowbray,  The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights 
by the European Court of Human Rights (2004), at 205 – 207;  D. Shelton,  Remedies in International Human 
Rights Law (2nd edn., 2006), at 123. 
 111  See Thune,  ‘ The Right to an Effective Remedy in Domestic Law: Article 13 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights ’ , in D. Gomien (ed.),  Broadening the Frontiers of Human Rights: Essays in Honour of Asbjorne 
Eide (1993), at 79, 82, 83 (stating that  ‘ Article 13 is often invoked by complainants, but  … the complaint 
is rarely successful ’ , and noting that, as of 1992, the ECHR had found violations of Art. 13 in only 3 of 46 
cases in which applicants alleged a violation of the provision). 
 112  See, e.g. , App. No. 59450/00,  Ramirez Sanchez v. France (Grand Chamber, 2006), at paras 157 – 160. 
 113  Mowbray,  supra note 110, at 207. 
 114  App. No. 51564/99,  Č onka v. Belgium (2002), at para. 83. 
 115  E.g. App. No. 38361/97,  Anguelova v. Bulgaria (2002), at para. 161. 
 116  App. No. 48254/99,  Cobzaru v. Romania (2007), at para. 82 (summarizing earlier case law). 
 117  Č onka v. Belgium ,  supra note 114 , at para. 79; App. No. 40035/98,  Jabari v. Turkey (2000), at para. 50. 
 118  See, e.g.,  Č onka v. Belgium ,  supra note 114 , at para. 83 (reviewing the procedures and practices by which 
the Belgian Conseil d’Etat may stay execution of a collective expulsion order and concluding that the 
remedy was  ‘ too uncertain to enable the requirements of Article 13 to be satisﬁ ed ’ ); App. No. 75529/01, 
 Sürmeli v. Germany (Grand Chamber, 2006), at paras 80 – 115 (examining in detail four distinct remedies 
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 scrutiny has triggered a sharp response from some states, which have argued that 
this approach risks overburdening their judicial and administrative systems. The 
Court’s reply has been unyielding:  ‘ Article 13 imposes on the Contracting States the 
duty to organise their judicial systems in such a way that their courts can meet its 
requirements. ’ 119 
 The ECtHR has even required remedies for excessively lengthy judicial proceedings, 
which, as noted above, account for a large percentage of applications to Strasbourg. 
In doing so, the Court bolstered the treaty’s speedy justice right by compelling states 
to  ‘ prevent[] the alleged violation or its continuation, or  … provid[e] adequate redress 
for any violation that ha[s] already occurred ’ . 120 In the absence of such domestic rem-
edies,  ‘ individuals will systematically be forced to refer to the Court in Strasbourg com-
plaints that would otherwise, and in the Court’s opinion more appropriately, have to 
be addressed in the ﬁ rst place within the national legal system ’ . 121 In short, the ECtHR 
has used Article 13 both to ameliorate its own docket crisis and, more fundamentally, 
to reshape national legal systems to increase the likelihood that state ofﬁ cials will rem-
edy human rights violations at home. 
 C Expanding the ECtHR’s Remedial Powers: Non-monetary 
Reparations and Pilot Judgments 
 The ECtHR long adhered to a modest conception of its remedial powers. Its judgments 
simply declared whether a violation of the Convention had occurred. The Court did 
 ‘ not even consider [itself] competent to make recommendations to the condemned 
State as to which steps it should take to remedy the consequences of the treaty viola-
tion ’ . 122 Only if national law failed to provide full reparation did the ECtHR award  ‘ just 
satisfaction ’ to the complainant in the form of monetary compensation. 123 In all other 
respects, the Court entrusted responsibility for executing its judgments to the Com-
mittee of Ministers. 124 This deference was consistent with the intention of the treaty’s 
that the government alleged were available to challenge excessively lengthy proceedings  – a constitu-
tional complaint, an appeal to a higher authority, a special complaint alleging inaction, and an action for 
damages  – and concluding that all four were ineffective and thus insufﬁ cient to satisfy Art. 13). 
 119  Ibid ., at para. 84; see also App. No. 18015/03,  Schutte v. Austria (2007), at para. 36 (rejecting the gov-
ernment’s argument that states parties  ‘ should not be required under Article 13 to provide a remedy 
against delays caused by one of its highest courts ’ );  Sürmeli v. Germany ,  supra note 118, at para. 104 
(stating that the ECtHR had recently  ‘ undertaken a closer examination of the effectiveness, within the 
meaning of Article 13 of the Convention, of remedies in a number of Contracting States in respect of the 
length of proceedings ’ ). 
 120  App. No. 30210/96,  Kud ł a v. Poland (2000), at para. 158. In more recent judgments, the ECtHR has 
stated that  ‘ the best solution ’ is  ‘ a remedy designed to expedite the proceedings in order to prevent them 
from becoming excessively lengthy ’ in the ﬁ rst instance: see, e.g.,  Sürmeli v. Germany, supra note 118, at 
para. 100. 
 121  Kud ł a v. Poland, supra note 120, at para. 155. 
 122  Barkuysen and van Emmerik,  supra note 52, at 3. 
 123  European Convention,  supra note 1, Art. 41. 
 124  See Barkuysen and van Emmerik,  supra note 52, at 20 (describing supervision and enforcement of ECtHR 
judgments by the Committee of Ministers). 
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drafters, who sought to create a  ‘ sovereignty shield ’ that limited the Court’s intrusive-
ness by specifying that any  ‘ reparation to the injured party was to be owed only to the 
extent that it could be provided within the conﬁ nes of the domestic legal order ’ . 125 
 Within the last few years, however, the ECtHR has included speciﬁ c remedial obli-
gations in several high-proﬁ le judgments. This change, which some commentators 
characterize as a  ‘ radical ’ departure from the Court’s past practice, 126 developed in 
response to the Council of Europe’s judicial reform process launched in 2000. Politi-
cal and expert bodies in the Council, tasked with identifying ways to improve the 
execution of ECHR judgments, identiﬁ ed the Court’s unwillingness to identify speciﬁ c 
remedies as an impediment to speedy and full compliance. 127 The refusal had some-
times generated disputes within the Committee of Ministers concerning the scope of 
a respondent state’s legal obligations. 128 It also allowed states to interpret judgments 
narrowly, arguing that they were  ‘ free to make minimal changes to national law or 
no changes at all ’ . 129 
 Shortly after the publication of these criticisms, the ECtHR ﬁ rst articulated speciﬁ c 
reparations in judgments ﬁ nding a violation of the Convention. The Court initially 
conﬁ ned these pronouncements to  ‘ a limited number of speciﬁ c areas where there 
[was] an obvious limited choice as to how implementation should be conducted ’ . 130 
The practice soon became more commonplace, with the ECtHR ordering or recom-
mending remedies that penetrate deeply into the fabric of national law. 131 They 
include re-opening closed judicial proceedings, revising statutes, releasing illegally 
detained individuals, and restoring seized property to its owner. 132 Reviewing these 
 125  Von Staden,  ‘ Assessing the Impact of the Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights on Domestic 
Human Rights Policies ’ , paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Sci-
ence Association (1 Sept. 2007), at 7 (citing D. Leeb,  Die innerstaatliche Umsetzung der Feststellungsurteile 
des Europäischen Gerichtshofes für Menschenrechte im entschiedenen Fall (2001), at 18). 
 126  Leach,  ‘ Beyond the Bug River  – A New Dawn for Redress Before the European Court of Human Rights ’ 
[2005]  Eur Human Rts L Rev 147, at 149 ( ‘ in one notable area the Court has begun to throw off former 
constraints and to embark on a more expansive, radical agenda: in its provision of redress to successful 
applicants ’ ). 
 127  See European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission),  Opinion on the Implementa-
tion of the Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights , Op. No. 209/2002 (Dec. 2002); see also Bates, 
 ‘ Supervision of the Execution of Judgments delivered by the European Court of Human Rights: The Chal-
lenges Facing the Committee of Ministers ’ , in Christou and Raymond,  supra note 52, at 49, 70 and n. 94 
(citing reports and resolutions criticizing the ECtHR for lack of clarity in specifying remedial measures). 
 128  Bates,  supra note 127, at 70 and n. 93; see also von Staden,  supra note 125, at 9 (stating that  ‘ even 
though [a] case decided at Strasbourg implicates a general governmental policy, such as a particular 
legal provision, the state may seek to portray the violation found by the Court as unique and thus limit its 
response to the individual case, thereby avoiding a change in its general policy ’ ). 
 129  Cameron,  supra note 65, at 228. 
 130  Bates,  supra note 127, at 70 and n. 94. 
 131  The remedies that the Court indicates are legally binding when they are phrased in mandatory language 
and appear in the operative part of the judgment. In other cases, the Court phrases remedies as recom-
mendations rather than obligatory commands: see Colandrea,  ‘ On the Power of the European Court of 
Human Rights to Order Speciﬁ c Non-monetary Measures: Some Remarks in Light of the  Assandize, Bro-
niowski and  Sejdovic Cases ’ , 7  Human Rts L Rev (2007) 396, at 397 – 399. 
 132  See  ibid ., at 398 – 403 (reviewing case law). 
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cases, one commentator has proclaimed, perhaps prematurely, that  ‘ the shackles 
of a merely declaratory approach to redress have now, rightly, been thrown off for 
good ’ . 133 
 A second remedial issue that has received signiﬁ cant attention in the Council of 
Europe reform process concerns human rights problems that affect large groups of 
similarly situated individuals. In 2004, the Committee of Ministers issued a reso-
lution inviting the ECtHR to identify in its judgments  ‘ what it considers to be an 
underlying systemic problem and the source of that problem, in particular when 
it is likely to give rise to numerous applications, so as to assist States in ﬁ nding the 
appropriate solution and the Committee of Ministers in supervising the execution of 
judgments ’ . 134 
 Only a month later, the ECtHR delivered its ﬁ rst  ‘ pilot judgment ’ in  Broniowski 
v. Poland , 135 a case involving a landowner forced to abandon property after a shift 
in the country’s borders following the Second World War. The dispute  ‘ originated 
in a widespread problem which results from a malfunctioning of Polish legislation 
and administrative practice ’ affecting 80,000 property claimants and 167 pending 
applications. 136 After ﬁ nding a violation of the right to property, the ECtHR held that 
Poland was obligated to provide a remedy  ‘ at national level ’ that  ‘ take[s] into account 
the many people affected. Above all, the measures adopted must be such as to remedy 
the systemic defect underlying the Court’s ﬁ nding of a violation so as not to overbur-
den the Convention system with large numbers of applications deriving from the same 
cause. ’ 137 One year later, the Court approved a friendly settlement of the dispute, but 
only after Poland had enacted new legislation that provided compensatory remedies 
to all of the former property owners. 138 
 The ECtHR’s creation of international law’s ﬁ rst class action mechanism 139  ‘ saved 
the Court an enormous amount of time and labour ’ and dramatically publicized its 
determination to ﬁ nd comprehensive solutions to systemic human rights problems. 140 
The Court has since applied the pilot judgment procedure to civil and political rights 
violations in other member states. 141 And it has indicated that its review encom-
passes not only identifying structural violations but also scrutinizing the legislation 
and administrative regulations that national governments adopt to comply with its 
 133  Leach,  supra note 126, at 149. But see Colandrea,  supra note 131, at 411 (concluding that  ‘ [o]nly when 
the violation is such that it excludes any choice as to the means of reparation open to the State will the 
Court formulate a speciﬁ c measure ’ ). 
 134  Res. (2004)3 of the Committee of Ministers on judgments revealing an underlying systemic problem (12 
May 2004). 
 135  App. No. 31443/96 (Grand Chamber, 2004). 
 136  Ibid., at para. 189. 
 137  Ibid., at para. 193. 
 138  Broniowski v. Poland ,  supra note 135, at paras 39 – 42 (Grand Chamber, 2005) (friendly settlement). 
 139  See Aceves,  ‘ Actio Popularis? The Class Action in International Law ’ [2003]  U Chicago Legal Forum 353, 
at 391 ( ‘ [c]lass action litigation is not recognized as a procedural mechanism in international law ’ ). 
 140  Caﬂ isch,  supra note 3, at 413; see also Leach,  supra note 126, at 162 – 163. 
 141  See Garlicki,  ‘ Broniowski and After: On the Dual Nature of  “ Pilot Judgments ” ’ , in L. Caﬂ isch  et al. (eds), 
 Liber Amicorum Luzius Wildhaber (2007), at 177, 186 – 191. 
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 remedial orders and recommendations. 142 Stated differently, the ECtHR has arrogated 
to itself the power to monitor compliance with its most far-reaching judgments, a 
power that was previously the exclusive province of the Council of Europe’s political 
bodies. 
 4 Evaluating Proposals to Redesign the ECtHR:
Embeddedness as a Deep Structural Principle of the 
Strasbourg Supervisory System 
 The previous parts of this article identiﬁ ed several areas in which the ECtHR has 
revised its case law to increase its scrutiny of member states ’ human rights prac-
tices. Ameliorating the Court’s looming docket crisis provides a partial explanation 
of these marked jurisprudential shifts. The new pilot judgment procedure, for exam-
ple, compels governments to ﬁ nd systemic solutions for widespread human rights 
problems and thereby preclude large numbers of applicants from ﬁ ling complaints 
in Strasbourg. 
 At a more fundamental level, however, the recent changes in the Court’s case law 
reﬂ ect the emergence of diffuse embeddedness as a deep structural principle of the 
European human rights regime. 143 Embeddedness does not supplant subsidiarity, a 
long-held tenet of the Convention’s supervisory system. Rather, embeddedness serves 
as subsidiarity’s necessary complement. It authorizes the ECtHR to adopt a more inter-
ventionist stance when the justiﬁ cations for deference to national decision-makers are 
diminished or absent. Where, for example, regions or localities are overwhelmed by 
violence, or inefﬁ cient domestic judicial systems make timely and effective remedies a 
practical impossibility, the core values underlying the Convention’s  ‘ special character 
as a treaty for the collective enforcement of human rights ’ , 144 are best served by giving 
the ECtHR a more assertive (but hopefully temporary) supervisory role. 
 To be clear, enhanced regional supervision does not seek to aggrandize the powers 
of the ECtHR or those of the Council of Europe. Its short-term objectives are, instead, 
to bolster the capacity of national institutions and to  ‘ backstop domestic political and 
legal groups trying to comply with international legal obligations ’ . 145 The ultimate 
aim, however, is to revive the subsidiarity doctrine when domestic decision-makers 
have resumed their rightful position as the Convention’s ﬁ rst-line defenders. 
 Admittedly, these goals are audacious. They cannot be achieved by the Court alone. 
And even with the full backing of the Council of Europe’s political and expert bodies, 
 142  See App. No. 36813/97,  Scordino v. Italy (No. 1) (Grand Chamber, 2006) (ﬁ nding that new legislation, 
enacted by the government to remedy widespread and systemic delays in judicial proceedings that the 
ECtHR had reviewed in earlier judgments, itself violated the Convention). 
 143  That alleviating docket congestion is not the sole or even the primary rationale for these doctrinal devel-
opments is illustrated by cases in which the ECtHR acts as a ﬁ rst instance tribunal: see  supra Part 3A. The 
Court’s assumption of this role can only increase its case load in the short and medium term. 
 144  Soering v. United Kingdom , ECtHR, Series A No. 161 (1989), at 34. 
 145  Slaughter and Burke-White,  supra note 20, at 333. 
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they face several potential obstacles. These challenges notwithstanding, I argue that 
the embeddedness principle is an appropriate aspiration for the world’s most advanced 
human rights system  – a system that has proved its ability to evolve institutionally, 
politically, and legally, and whose member states have now unanimously  incorporated 
international human rights standards into their respective national laws. 
 In the sections that follow, I ﬁ rst review judicial reform proposals that the Council 
of Europe has already adopted or is currently considering that would increase the con-
nections between the ECtHR and national courts and parliaments, further embedding 
the Court in domestic legal systems. I then discuss several additional measures that 
would augment the diffuse embeddedness principle and extend it to the Council of 
Europe’s political and expert bodies. I conclude by discussing the obstacles to imple-
menting these and other reform proposals. 
 A Reforms that Further Embed the ECtHR in National Legal Systems 
 As explained above, the ECtHR is not directly embedded in domestic legal systems. 146 
It has no mechanism  – such as the ECJ’s preliminary reference procedure  – to forge 
direct links to national courts or government institutions. Four recently imple-
mented or proposed reforms of the Strasbourg supervisory system would, however, 
strengthen the Court’s connections to national courts and, to a lesser extent, to 
national parliaments. 
 The ﬁ rst reform is already underway. In 2000, the Committee of Ministers launched 
an ambitious programme to convince national governments to authorize their courts 
to reopen judicial proceedings following an adverse ECtHR judgment. 147 In response 
to this initiative,  ‘ [m]ore than a dozen member states have adopted legislation provid-
ing for the reopening of criminal proceedings and a number of courts have developed 
their case-law so as to allow for such reopening ’ . 148 As of 2006, such remedies are 
now available in 80 per cent of member states in criminal cases and about half of the 
Convention countries in civil and administrative cases. 149 These changes are likely 
to enhance embeddedness in two complementary ways. First, an increasing number 
of national courts will be empowered to execute, more or less automatically, ECtHR 
judgments that ﬁ nd fault with domestic trials. Secondly, Strasbourg judges, aware of 
this fact, can target their increasingly precise remedial orders and recommendations 
directly to their domestic judicial counterparts. 
 146  See  supra Part 2C. 
 147  See Recommendation Rec(2000)2 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the re-examination 
or reopening of certain cases at domestic level following judgments of the ECtHR (19 Jan. 2000), at 2. 
 148  Steering Committee for Human Rights, Committee of Experts for the Improvement of Procedures for 
the Protection of Human Rights (DH-PR), Draft Follow-up Sheets on the Implementation of the Five Re-
commendations, DH-PR(2006)002 Addendum I (4 Apr. 2006), available at:  www.coe.int/t/f/droits_de_
l’homme/DH-PR(2006) 002EAddendumI.asp, at 5. 
 149  See  Ensuring the continued effectiveness of the European Convention on Human Rights  – The Implementation of 
the reform measures adopted by the Committee of Ministers at its 114th Session , 116th Session of the Com-
mittee of Ministers, CM(2006)39 ﬁ nal (12 May 2006), at 6. 
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 A second reform was recently proposed by the  ‘ Group of Wise Persons ’ , a panel of 
experts charged with studying the long-term effectiveness of the European human 
rights system. In its ﬁ nal report published in November 2006, the experts  recommended 
 ‘ institutionalising the links between the [ECtHR] and the highest courts in the mem-
ber states ’ by authorizing the latter courts to  ‘ apply to the [ECtHR] for advisory opin-
ions ’ . 150 The goal of this  ‘ innovation ’ is to  ‘ foster dialogue between international and 
domestic judges ’ and  ‘ enhance the Court’s  “ constitutional ” role ’ . 151 To reduce the 
pressure on the ECtHR’s already overburdened case load, the report proposed that 
 ‘ only constitutional courts or courts of last instance ’ be authorized to seek non-bind-
ing opinions from the ECtHR and that their requests should  ‘ only concern questions or 
principle or of general interest relating to the interpretation ’ of the Convention. 152 
 A third proposal to redesign the ECtHR, also advocated by the Group of Wise  Persons, 
would shift responsibility for awarding monetary damages to successful complainants 
from the ECtHR to national courts. Under the Group’s proposal, each member state 
would  ‘ designate a judicial body with responsibility for determining the amount of 
compensation ’ within the time limits set by the Court and following the  ‘ criteria laid 
down in the Court’s case-law ’ . 153 Dissatisﬁ ed complainants could challenge these dam-
age awards before the ECtHR. 154 If the member states agree to adopt this new remedial 
structure, the ECtHR will, for the ﬁ rst time, exercise appellate review over domestic 
judges, who, in turn, will act as compliance partners for the monetary component of 
all ECtHR judgments. 
 A fourth institutional reform with ancillary embedding effects concerns an ongoing 
effort to ensure that draft statutes, existing legislation, and administrative practices 
comply with the Convention and with ECtHR case law. In 2004, the Committee of 
Ministers urged member states to adopt  ‘ appropriate and effective mechanisms for 
systematically verifying ’ the treaty-compatibility of domestic laws. 155 These review 
 procedures  – which are now in place in various forms in all member states  – help 
 150  Report of the Group of Wise Persons to the Committee of Ministers, CM(2006)203 (15 Nov. 2006), at 21. 
The Group of Wise Persons considered, but ultimately rejected, creating a preliminary ruling procedure 
for domestic judges to refer legal questions to the ECtHR  – an institutional linkage that exists between the 
ECJ and European national courts. According to the Final Report, such a mechanism  ‘ represents an alter-
native model to the judicial control established by the Convention, which requires domestic remedies to 
be exhausted. The combination of the two systems would create signiﬁ cant legal and practical problems 
and would considerably increase the Court’s workload ’ :  ibid . 
 151  Ibid ., at 21. Although the report refers to the ECtHR’s constitutional justice function, its proposal for 
advisory opinions provides a mechanism for the Court more deeply to embed its interpretations of the 
Convention in national legal systems. 
 152  Ibid ., at 22. The experts further recommended that the ECtHR  ‘ have discretion to refuse to answer a 
request for an opinion ’ without the need to give reasons for its refusal:  ibid . 
 153  Group of Wise Persons,  supra note 150, at 25 – 26. For a similar proposal see Mahoney,  ‘ Thinking a Small 
Unthinkable: Repatriating Reparation from the European Court of Human Rights to the National Legal 
Order ’ , in Caﬂ isch  et al. (eds),  supra note 141, at 263. 
 154  Group of Wise Persons,  supra note 150, at 26. 
 155  Recommendation Rec(2004)5 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the veriﬁ cation of the 
compatibility of draft laws, existing laws, and administrative practice with the standards laid down in the 
European Convention on Human Rights (12 May 2004), at 2. 
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domestic institutions to identify potential treaty violations before they generate 
 complaints to Strasbourg. 156 The Committee of Ministers has recently recommended 
that the ECtHR become more involved in this veriﬁ cation process. 157 This would 
occur, for example, if member states adopted the Group of Wise Persons ’ proposal to 
allow constitutional and supreme courts to request advisory opinions from the ECtHR. 
When exercising the veriﬁ cation functions already entrusted to them under national 
law, 158 these domestic courts could ask Strasbourg judges to review the Convention-
compatibility of existing or proposed legislation. 
 These four initiatives raise complex issues of institutional design. Some may increase 
the ECtHR’s already overburdened case load, at least in the short term. Others are 
long-term solutions that require revising not only the ECtHR’s powers  – revisions 
that the Court itself may view unfavourably 159  – but also the jurisdiction of domestic 
courts. 160 Taken together, however, the initiatives reveal that many reform propos-
als nominally intended to ease the ECtHR’s docket crisis will also enhance the links 
between the Court and the disaggregated branches of national governments. 
 B Additional Proposals to Promote Diffuse Embeddedness 
 The initiatives reviewed above would further embed the ECtHR in national legal and 
political systems. However, the proposals were drafted with different aims  – to reduce the 
Court’s case load and improve compliance with its judgments. To more ﬁ rmly implant 
diffuse embeddedness as a deep structural principle of the Convention, additional meas-
ures will be likely to be needed. Some measures can be implemented by the ECtHR itself. 
Others will require action by the Council of Europe and its member states. 161 I discuss 
several proposals below, reviewing them roughly in the order of the ease of their imple-
mentation. Before doing so, however, I note an important caveat  – each proposal is pre-
liminary and deserves more extended analysis than I can provide in this article. 
 156  Ibid .; Committee of Ministers,  supra note 149, at 7. 
 157  See  Declaration of the Committee of Ministers on sustained action to ensure the effectiveness of the implementa-
tion of the European Convention on Human Rights at national and European levels (19 May 2006), at para. 
X(g). 
 158  A recent Council of Europe survey found that national courts play a pre-eminent role in reviewing exist-
ing legislation and administrative practices to determine their compatibility with the Convention: see 
Committee of Experts,  supra note 148, at 47 – 51. 
 159  See J.-P. Costa,  ‘ Comments on the Wise Persons ’ Report from the Perspective of the European Court of 
Human Rights ’ , in  Colloquy on the Future Developments of the European Court of Human Rights in the light 
of the Wise Persons ’ Report (San Marino, 22 – 23 Mar. 2007), at 39, 42 (hereinafter  San Marino Colloquy ) 
(noting that Group of Wise Persons ’ proposal that domestic courts be authorized to request advisory opin-
ions from the ECtHR and to determine compensation to prevailing complainants were ideas  ‘ in respect of 
which the Court is unfavourable or at least has reservations ’ ). 
 160  See Thomassen,  ‘ Relations between the Court and States Parties to the Convention ’ , in  San Marino 
 Colloquy, supra note 159, at 58, 64 (stating that proposal to refer damages remedies to domestic courts 
could be  ‘ incompatible with national systems ’ and suggesting an alternative proposal). 
 161  Cf. Mahoney,  ‘ Parting Thoughts of an Outgoing Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights ’ , 26 
 Human Rts LJ (2005) 345, at 346 (asserting that  ‘ further reform, quite radical  – in the sense of structural 
changes that redesign the architecture of adjudication by the Court  – is called for in addition to the oft-
cited  “ managerial ” changes ’ ). 
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 The easiest and least controversial measure concerns the new admissibility rule in 
Protocol No. 14. This provision authorizes the ECtHR to dismiss a complaint if it deter-
mines that the applicant  ‘ has not suffered a signiﬁ cant disadvantage, unless respect 
for human rights as deﬁ ned in the Convention and the Protocols requires an exami-
nation of the application on the merits and provided that no case may be rejected on 
this ground which has not been duly considered by a domestic tribunal ’ . 162 According 
to Protocol No. 14 ’ s explanatory report, dismissal of cases in which an individual has 
suffered only  ‘ trivial ’ harm is consistent with the subsidiarity principle and allows the 
ECtHR to manage its workload more effectively. 163 The Court cannot reject such com-
plaints, however, if respect for human rights requires an examination of their merits 
or if the claims have never been considered by a domestic court. The drafters left these 
two  ‘ safeguard ’ clauses, as well as the  ‘ signiﬁ cant disadvantage ’ clause itself,  ‘ open to 
interpretation ’ to allow the ECtHR to clarify their precise meaning. 164 
 Consistent with this intent, the ECtHR should interpret the new admissibility rule 
to bolster its indirect control over national courts. In particular, it should create an 
incentive for domestic judges to apply the Convention as interpreted by the ECtHR. 
Consider as an example a case concerning a civil or political right with respect to 
which the Court has developed an extensive jurisprudence. When a national court, 
reviewing a complaint alleging a violation of that right, applies the treaty’s text (or 
its national law equivalent) without considering this case law, the ECtHR should hold 
that the complaint has  ‘ not been duly considered by a domestic tribunal ’ and cannot 
be dismissed under the new admissibility rule. This interpretation sends a clear sig-
nal to domestic judges  – the closer they adhere to ECtHR jurisprudence, the greater 
the chance they will avoid the  ‘ international embarrassment ’ of a later reversal in 
Strasbourg. 165 Over time, this strategic interpretation will increase the respect that 
national courts give to ECtHR judgments and enhance the opportunities to remedy 
treaty violations at home. 
 A second way to enhance embeddedness concerns the award of non-monetary 
remedies. As described above, the ECtHR recently changed its longstanding practice 
of refusing to identify the remedial measures that states must adopt to comply with its 
rulings. 166 The Court has not, however, indicated such measures in every judgment, 
creating needless uncertainty for states and inequity among applicants. Consistently 
with Protocol No. 11 ’ s grant of direct access to individuals and with the Conven-
tion’s effectiveness principle, 167 the Court should identify appropriate non-monetary 
 162  Protocol No. 14,  supra note 85, Art. 12(b). 
 163  See Protocol No. 14 Explanatory Report,  supra note 88, at paras 77 – 82. 
 164  See  ibid., at paras 80 – 82. The proposal to add this discretionary admissibility criterion to the Convention 
generated considerable controversy among NGOs, members of the Court, and the Council of Europe’s 
political and expert bodies: see Beernaert,  supra note 87, at 552 and nn. 43 – 46. 
 165  Kumm and Comella,  supra note 40, at 486. 
 166  See  supra Part 3C. 
 167  Mowbray,  supra note 63, at 72 ( ‘ Another signiﬁ cant method of interpretation developed by the Court has 
been to interpret the Convention in a manner that seeks to ensure that  … rights and freedoms are applied 
in ways that are of  “ practical and effective ” use to complainants ’ ). 
154 EJIL 19 (2008), 125–159
 remedies in its judgments whenever such remedies will restore applicants to the  status 
quo prior to the violation. 168 Such remedial speciﬁ city has important consequences 
for embeddedness. It helps applicants to pressure governments to comply with the 
Court’s judgments and it facilitates the Council of Europe’s enhanced efforts to moni-
tor domestic enforcement of those rulings. 169 
 The new pilot judgment procedure raises a third embeddedness issue. The ECtHR has 
now issued several judgments addressing systemic human rights problems. Although 
the Court does not always use the pilot judgment label to describe such cases, it con-
sistently indicates general measures that governments should adopt to implement its 
rulings. 170 The Court has given almost no attention, however, to the fairness of the 
procedure itself. 
 The very name  ‘ pilot judgment ’ signiﬁ es that the ECtHR uses the ﬁ rst application 
that comes before it to address systemic violations of the Convention challenged in 
other complaints. But there is no guarantee that that ﬁ rst case accurately reﬂ ects all 
of the factual and legal issues raised by such violations. In addition, the ﬁ rst applicant 
enjoys privileged status relative to other complainants. During the time that the ﬁ rst 
complaint is under review, the other applications remain in stasis. 171 More troubling is 
the possibility that the ﬁ rst applicant will negotiate a friendly settlement that favours 
an individual damages award over systemic non-monetary remedies. 172 If the pilot 
judgment procedure is to serve as an effective tool for improving compliance with 
the Convention, the ECtHR must pay greater heed to the procedure’s legitimacy. The 
Court must develop safeguards to ensure that class-wide relief applies to all similarly 
situated applicants and is appropriate to the systemic human rights issues it has adju-
dicated on. 
 A fourth and more far-reaching way to anchor embeddedness as a deep structural 
principle would be to expand member states ’ obligations to provide effective domestic 
remedies for Convention violations. The ECtHR has already taken the ﬁ rst steps toward 
this goal in its recent interpretations of Article 13 analysed above. 173 The Council of 
 168  See Shelton,  supra note 110, at 281 ( ‘ Protocol No. 11 now makes the individual an initiating party to the 
proceedings and a direct focus or object of the case. The Court should therefore rely upon the inherent 
powers of international tribunals to afford adequate remedies to the injured party before it ’ ). 
 169  See Greer,  supra note 3, at 160; see also Leach,  ‘ The Effectiveness of the Committee of Ministers in Super-
vising Enforcement of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights ’ [2006]  Public L 443, 445 ( ‘ In 
recent years the Ministers ’ Deputies have sought to improve the efﬁ ciency and publicity of the execution 
control process and to develop their responses, in particular, to situations of delay and negligence ’ ). 
 170  See Garlicki,  supra note 141, at 186 – 191. 
 171  See Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights,  ‘ “ Pinto ” cases adjourned pending decision on test 
case, Press Release 014 (18 Jan. 2005) (stating that the ECtHR had adjourned  ‘ over 800 Italian length-of-
proceedings cases, pending its decision in a test case concerning the application of Italy’s  “ Pinto Law ” ’ ). 
 172  Cf. von Staden,  supra note 125, at 9 and n. 46 (noting that  ‘ a state may prefer to simply pay just satisfac-
tion without taking substantive steps to remedy the situation and fully remove the consequences of the 
violation ’ and suggesting that many governments enter into friendly settlements for this reason). To be 
sure, the ECtHR may not approve a friendly settlement unless it manifests a  ‘ respect for human rights as 
deﬁ ned in the Convention and the Protocols thereto ’ European Convention,  supra note 1, Art. 37. It re-
mains unclear, however, how stringently the Court will apply that requirement in pilot judgment cases. 
 173  See  supra Part 3B. 
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Europe’s political bodies have cited these developments with approval. In a 2004 re -
commendation  ‘ on the improvement of domestic remedies ’ , the Committee of Minis-
ters urged the member states  ‘ constant[ly to] review ’ the Court’s case law to ensure 
that such remedies  ‘ exist for anyone with an arguable complaint of a violation of the 
Convention, and that these remedies are effective, in that they can result in a decision 
on the merits of the complaint and adequate redress for any violation found ’ . 174 
 The Committee’s endorsement provides political support for the ECtHR further to 
expand its Article 13 jurisprudence. 175 The Court could, for example, more precisely 
deﬁ ne the type of investigations or compensatory relief required for different Conven-
tion violations and tighten the standards for deciding whether domestic remedies qual-
ify as effective. 176 There is, however, only so far that Strasbourg judges can plausibly 
stretch Article 13 ’ s text. A more radical expansion of domestic remedies will require 
a new protocol, subject to ratiﬁ cation by each member state. If political support for 
such a protocol is uncertain, its drafters could adopt a moderate text that requires 
states to  ‘ make available at the national level some easily accessible mechanism for 
making full and rapid reparation for any violation of the Convention that has been 
found in a judgment by the Court ’ . 177 A more ambitious protocol would build upon the 
recent incorporation of the European Convention into the domestic laws of all member 
states and  ‘ require effective  judicial remedies ’ . Such a protocol could  ‘ grant  … jurisdic-
tion to all domestic courts  … to consider complaints about the violation of Conven-
tion standards when adjudicating complaints against public authorities ’ and provide 
 ‘ individual constitutional complaints processes to all national constitutional courts or 
their equivalents ’ . 178 
 As the foregoing discussion illustrates, the more far-reaching initiatives to promote 
embeddedness will require the support of the Council of Europe. The member states of 
the Council, acting as a collective, must provide the political and ﬁ nancial assistance 
needed to encourage, cajole, and, where necessary, sanction insufﬁ ciently resourced 
or recalcitrant countries to deter human rights violations from occurring and to rem-
edy breaches of the Convention once they have occurred. 
 To achieve these results, the Council should, ﬁ rst and foremost, increase the resources 
available for educating and training government authorities, law enforcement ofﬁ -
cials, and domestic judges (especially those serving on lower and  administrative 
 174  Recommendation Rec(2004)6 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the improvement of 
domestic remedies (12 May 2004), at 2. 
 175  A different Committee of Ministers recommendation adopted on the same date provided the impetus for 
the ECtHR to create the pilot judgment procedure: see  supra note 134 and the text accompanying it. 
 176  C. Ovey and R. White ,  Jacobs and White on the European Convention on Human Rights (4th edn., 2006), at 
471 (stating that the  ‘ potential for the development through interpretation of the rights contained in 
Article 13 remains high ’ ). 
 177  Mahoney,  supra note 153, at 282; see also Group of Wise Persons,  supra note 150, at 24 (proposing the 
adoption of a protocol that obligates member states  ‘ to introduce domestic legal mechanisms  … to redress 
the damage resulting from any violation of the Convention, and especially those resulting from structural 
or general shortcomings in a state’s law or practice ’ ). 
 178  Greer,  supra note 3, at 281. 
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courts) about the European human rights regime. 179 The goal is to convert these pub-
lic actors into the Convention’s ﬁ rst-line defenders and, failing that, into  ‘ compliance 
constituencies ’ for the Court in the wake of an adverse ruling against the state. 180 Given 
the large number of countries and audiences to which such outreach efforts might be 
directed,  ‘ it makes more sense  … for scarce resources to be targeted upon low-compli-
ance states than all states equally ’ , 181 and to emphasize rights and freedoms that are 
relevant to different audiences. 
 The Council should also consider more focused strategies to promote embedded-
ness. One such strategy involves expanding the activities of National Human Rights 
Institutions (NHRIs). 182 The Council of Europe could restructure the Convention’s 
supervisory system to enable these domestic advocates for civil and political liberties to 
assist it in a variety of ways. Such assistance could include preparing periodic reports 
of human rights  ‘ hot spots ’ in Europe; empowering NHRIs to ﬁ le complaints alleging 
Convention violations with constitutional or high courts; authorizing them to inter-
vene in pilot judgment cases to provide additional information about the systemic 
human rights problems under review; and assisting the Committee of Ministers and 
the Parliamentary Assembly in policing compliance with the Court’s judgments. 183 
 More difﬁ cult issues arise where a country fails to comply with ECtHR judgments 
against it. The Council should develop a suite of  ‘ positive incentives ’ and  ‘ punishment 
mechanisms ’  – carrots and sticks, to use more colloquial language  – that it deploys 
to induce compliance with ECtHR rulings. 184 Positive incentives include foreign aid, 
democracy assistance programmes, and funds to support domestic non-governmen-
tal organizations. In the past, the Council has used these measures to reward former 
Soviet bloc countries for implementing the commitments they made when joining the 
organization and to spur additional reforms. 185 It could follow a similar strategy to 
encourage compliance with ECtHR judgments, in particular those that address sys-
temic human rights problems. 186 
 Sanctions for non-compliance should be graded according to the nature of the vio-
lation and the reason the state proffers for failing to comply. The sticks available to 
the Council include fact-ﬁ nding missions to investigate the causes of non-compliance, 
 179  Programmes for training and assistance already exist, but they have been criticized as  ‘ under-funded and 
extremely limited in scope ’ :  ibid ., at 108 (internal quotations omitted). 
 180  Kahler,  ‘ Conclusion: The Causes and Consequences of Legalization ’ , 54  Int’l Org (2000) 661, at 675. 
 181  Greer,  supra note 3, at 131. 
 182  See  ibid., at 289 – 301 (discussing the activities and functions of NHRIs). 
 183  This para. is inspired by Steven Greer’s thoughtful reform proposals: see  ibid., at 310 – 311. 
 184  Sundstrom,  ‘ Carrots and Sticks for Democracy in the OAS: Comparison with the East European Experi-
ence ’ , 10  Canadian Foreign Pol (2003) 45, at 46. 
 185  See Jordan,  ‘ Does Membership Have Its Privileges?: Entrance into the Council of Europe and Compliance 
with Human Rights Norms ’ , 25  Human Rts Q (2003) 660, at 681 (stating that  ‘ in November 2002, the 
Council granted Russia 18 million euros toward implementing a number of new legal reforms, and in 
recognition of its fulﬁ lling Council obligations ’ relating to human rights). 
 186  Such measures must be used sparingly to avoid the perception that the Council rewards countries that 
refuse to comply with ECtHR judgments. Seen from this perspective, cases involving lack of capacity 
present more attractive cases for  ‘ carrots ’ than those of willful non-compliance. 
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meetings with political representatives to elicit speciﬁ c timetables for implementation, 
and, as a last resort, suspending the beneﬁ ts of Council membership. In April 2000, for 
example, the Parliamentary Assembly temporarily suspended Russia’s voting privi-
leges in reaction to a critical report by Council of Europe experts who had recently 
visited Chechnya. Commentators are divided, however, over whether even this rela-
tively mild sanction engendered any material improvement of human rights practices 
in the region. 187 
 C. Impediments to Redesigning the ECtHR 
 Proposals to redesign the ECtHR have thus far been developed with strong backing 
from the Council of Europe’s member states. The widespread support for these reforms 
is remarkable, given that the Court will possess greater authority to restrict govern-
ment regulation of an expanding array of civil and political liberties. It is uncertain, 
however, how far the political will for change extends. In particular, the Council faces 
two obstacles to embedding the ECtHR more deeply in national legal systems. 
 The ﬁ rst impediment involves the growing geographic disparity in the Court’s case 
load. As of 1 January 2007, ﬁ ve states  – Poland, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and the 
Ukraine  – together accounted for 57 per cent of all applications to the ECtHR, with 
Russia alone the source of more than 21 per cent of complaints. 188 The disproportion-
ate number of cases emanating from this small number of countries creates political 
fault lines that threaten to derail the ECtHR reform process. 
 The most overt resistance has come from Russia, which in December 2006 became 
the only member of the Council of Europe to reject Protocol No. 14, thus prevent-
ing its entry into force. Some representatives in the State Duma pointed to the Pro-
tocol’s single-judge screening procedure to justify the refusal to ratify the treaty. 189 
But resistance to reforms runs far deeper and reﬂ ects the government’s opposition to 
ECtHR judgments involving extrajudicial killings in Chechnya, the refusal to extradite 
Chechen rebels from Georgia, and a dispute involving the separatist Transdniestria 
region of Moldova. 190 These cases have soured the relationship between the Russian 
government and the Council. 191 
 187  Compare Sundstrom,  supra note 184, at 50 (asserting that Russia was  ‘ clearly embarrassed about this 
punishment  … and was eager to satisfy the [Council] demands quickly to restore its status in the [Coun-
cil] ’ ) with Baker,  ‘ Europe Council Restores Russia’s Rights ’ , NewYork Times , 26 Jan. 2001, at A14 (re-
porting statements by Council ofﬁ cials that the suspension of Russia’s voting privileges weakened the 
Council’s ability to monitor human rights standards in Chechnya). 
 188  Registry of the European Court of Human Rights,  Survey of Activities 2006 (2007), at 51. 
 189  ‘Duma Gives It to the European Court’,  Kommersant (21 Dec. 2006), available at:
 www.kommersant.com/p732043/r_500/State_Duma_European_Court/. 
 190  See App. No. 36378/02,  Shamayev and Others v. Georgia and Russia (2005); App. No. 48787/99,  Ila ş cu 
and Others v. Moldova and Russia (Grand Chamber, 2004); Kaye,  ‘ International Decisions:  Isayeva, Yu-
supova and Bazayeva v. Russia and  Khashiyev and Akayeva v. Russia ’ , 99  AJIL (2005) 873. 
 191  President Vladimir Putin has explained the Duma’s rejection of Protocol No. 14 as a reaction to  ‘ a poli-
tisation of the Court’s judgments ’ ; O. Spijkers,  How Russia Hijacks the European Court of Human Rights , 
1948: an International Blog at the University of Leiden, available at:  http://weblog.leidenuniv.nl/
fdr/1948/2007/03/how_russia_hijacks_the_european_court_of_human_rights_1.php . 
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 Russia’s rejection of Protocol No. 14 may, however, be only a temporary ploy. The 
country’s status as the only protocol hold-out state offers a tempting opportunity to 
negotiate concessions from other European countries  – a tactic Russian government 
employed when it ﬁ rst rejected but later ratiﬁ ed the Kyoto Protocol. 192 On the other 
hand, the growing number of complaints against Russia, which, as noted above, now 
comprise nearly one quarter of all applications to the ECtHR, may entrench resistance 
to reforms that  ‘ facilitate[e] the efﬁ cient determination of cases by the Court ’ . 193 
 A second obstacle to creating a more embedded human rights regime concerns the 
ECtHR’s relationship with national courts. As noted above, many proposals to rede-
sign the ECtHR seek to strengthen the ties between the judges in Strasbourg and their 
domestic colleagues. 194 The cooperation of national judiciaries is essential to main-
taining and improving compliance with European human rights standards. Enhanc-
ing domestic judicial support for the ECtHR faces at least two challenges, however. 
 First, in countries where courts are not fully independent, judges may be reluctant 
to exercise the muscular judicial review needed to remedy Convention violations at 
home. Where executive branch ofﬁ cials or legislators maintain substantial control 
over judicial appointments, retentions, or salaries, a judge’s interest in professional 
survival sharply diminishes his or her incentive to hold governments accountable 
for human rights abuses. This highlights the importance of developing long-term 
initiatives to promote judicial independence, bolster democratic institutions, and 
educate and train judges and other public ofﬁ cials concerning the Convention’s 
requirements. 195 
 A second and more serious challenge to the ECtHR’s collaboration with national 
courts arises where those courts are themselves the source of Convention violations. 
As noted above, more than half of the Court’s recent judgments concern unfair trials 
and excessively lengthy judicial proceedings. 196 These defects in the domestic admin-
istration of justice reveal that the primary guarantors of individual rights in Europe 
are also often its primary violators. Since most due process violations are committed 
by lower-level tribunals, the ECtHR should encourage constitutional and supreme 
courts to apply Convention case law to resolve such cases before they generate a wave 
of complaints to Strasbourg. 197 The Court should also use the pilot judgment proce-
dure to require national parliaments to remedy due process violations caused by inad-
equately resourced and overburdened domestic judiciaries. These approaches may be 
supplemented by political strategies, including the  ‘ carrots and sticks ’ discussed in the 
previous section. 
 192  See  ibid. ; see also Grubb and Safonov,  ‘ Why is Russia Dragging its Feet on Kyoto? ’ ,  Financial Times , 14 July 
2003. 
 193  Mowbray,  ‘ Faltering Steps on the Path to Reform of the Strasbourg Enforcement System ’ , 7  Human Rts L 
Rev (2007) 609, at 610. 
 194  See  supra Part 4A and 4B. 
 195  See supra text accompanying notes 179 – 181 (reviewing these proposals). 
 196  See supra note 16. 
 197  See, e.g.,  Scordino v. Italy (No. 1) ,  supra note 142 (pilot judgment representing over 800 cases challenging 
the excessive length of proceedings in lower-level Italian courts). 
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 5   Conclusion 
 The individual complaints mechanism of the ECtHR is the crown jewel of the world’s 
most advanced international system for protecting civil and political liberties. In this 
article, I have argued that the recent proposals to redesign the ECtHR in response to 
a growing backlog of complaints should be understood not as ministerial changes in 
judicial procedure, nor as resolving the debate over whether the ECtHR should strive 
for individual or constitutional justice, but rather as raising more fundamental ques-
tions concerning the Court’s future identity. In particular, I have asserted that the 
Council of Europe, its member states, and ECtHR judges should recognize diffuse 
embeddedness as a deep structural principle of the European Convention, a princi-
ple that functions as a necessary complement to the subsidiary doctrine that has ani-
mated the region’s human rights regime since its inception. 
 Embeddedness, as deﬁ ned in this article, requires the Council of Europe’s politi-
cal and judicial bodies to bolster domestic mechanisms for remedying Convention 
violations at home, obviating the need for aggrieved individuals to seek relief at the 
regional level. The absence or inadequacy of these mechanisms justiﬁ es expanding 
the ECtHR’s review powers, albeit temporarily, until national decision-makers begin 
to function (or once again function) as the ﬁ rst-line defenders of the Convention’s 
rights and freedoms. 
 In recent years, the ECtHR has modiﬁ ed its jurisprudence to embed itself more ﬁ rmly 
in national legal and political systems. Where domestic authorities refuse to investi-
gate human rights abuses, for example, the Court has acted as a ﬁ rst instance tribunal 
with the power to ﬁ nd facts necessary to decide whether the government has violated 
the applicant’s rights. The ECtHR has also developed a more capacious understand-
ing of the Convention’s domestic remedies provision. And it has markedly expanded 
its remedial powers, issuing rulings that require states to provide speciﬁ c non-mon-
etary reparation and creating a novel pilot judgment procedure to remedy systemic 
 violations. 
 This article has identiﬁ ed several ways to extend these jurisprudential trends to 
enhance the ECtHR’s embeddedness. In addition to these judicial responses, strength-
ening the capacity of domestic institutions to remedy human rights violations requires 
political strategies. Short-term strategies include deploying positive incentives and 
graded sanctions to induce compliance with speciﬁ c ECtHR judgments. Longer-term 
approaches include expanding resources devoted to promoting judicial independence 
and training public ofﬁ cials in Strasbourg case law, actions that are appropriate when 
the will to remedy violations exists but the capacity to do so is lacking. In addition to 
improving adherence to ECtHR judgments, this combination of judicial and political 
action will help galvanize domestic interest groups to lobby and litigate for greater 
compliance, encouraging governments to remedy human rights violations at home 
and providing a more lasting solution to the ECtHR’s docket crisis. 
